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REDUCING INCARCERATION FOR 
YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS WITH A 
DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO 
SENTENCING 
Samantha Buckingham 
          Current sentencing practices have proven to be an ineffective 
method of rehabilitating criminal defendants. Such practices are 
unresponsive to developmental science breakthroughs, fail to promote 
rehabilitation, and drain society’s limited resources. These deficiencies 
are most acute when dealing with youthful offenders. Incarcerating 
youthful offenders, who are amenable to rehabilitative efforts, under 
current sentencing practices only serves to ensure such individuals will 
never become productive members of society. Drawing on the author’s 
experiences as a federal public defender, studies in developmental 
psychology and neuroscience, and the Supreme Court’s recent line of 
cases that acknowledge youthful offenders’ biological differences from 
adult offenders, the author proposes a restorative-justice approach to 
replace current sentencing practices. This solution includes tailoring a 
 
  Samantha Buckingham is a clinical professor and codirector of the Juvenile Justice 
Clinic at the Center for Juvenile Law and Policy (CJLP) at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. She 
supervises students who represent juvenile clients in delinquency courts in Los Angeles, and she 
teaches courses in the areas of Criminal Law, Trial Advocacy, and Juvenile Law. Prior to joining 
the faculty at Loyola Law School in 2008, Ms. Buckingham advocated on behalf of indigent 
clients for five years as a trial attorney at the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia 
(PDS). Prior to that, she taught high school at the Maya Angelou School, a Washington, D.C., 
charter high school for adjudicated and at-risk youth. She is especially grateful to all of her clients 
and would like to acknowledge what an honor and privilege it has been to work for them. In 
particular, she is grateful to the real Marcus and the real Ben, who both first inspired her to write 
this Article, along with the amazing couple in Marcus’s story whose open hearts and minds she 
admires and respects. She wishes to thank her research assistants Heidi Seo, Bryan Rhie, Elaine 
Kwak, Stephanie Cao, Seth Weiner, and Carolyn Tan. She would also like to thank Randy Hertz 
and the Clinical Writers Workshop at New York University Law School; colleagues at CJLP who 
have discussed this Article with her, especially Jojo Liu; colleagues at Loyola who have read this 
Article and provided valuable feedback, including Kevin Lapp, Michael Waterstone, Marcy 
Strauss, and Scott Wood; colleagues in criminal defense who have helped along the way, 
including Andrew Ferguson, Allison Chan, and Violeta Chapin; experts who have consulted with 
her, especially Laurence Steinberg and Michael Livermore; Chris McKee who first suggested she 
look into restorative justice when she told him about Marcus’s case; and Tim Curry, who was her 
law clerk at PDS when she represented Marcus. 
REDUCING INCARCERATION 9/6/2014  11:46 AM 
802 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:801 
 
youthful offender’s sentence to his or her developmental level and 
requiring a community-based mediation between victims and offenders. 
The proposal counteracts a major deficiency of current sentencing 
practices—the failure to offer youthful offenders an opportunity to truly 
understand their crimes. Only by doing so will a youthful offender be in 
a position to rehabilitate. This Article responds to possible critiques of 
the proposal, including concerns about the ability to accurately 
measure the success of a restorative-justice sentencing model, the fear 
of implicating the offender’s Fifth Amendment right against self 
incrimination, and the cost of implementing mediation-based efforts. 
Ultimately, this Article determines that a developmentally appropriate, 
community-based sentencing scheme—with restorative justice 
overtones—best addresses the unique situation youthful offenders find 
themselves in. A sentence for a youthful offender should—indeed, 
must—present meaningful opportunities for the youthful offender to 
rehabilitate, and age-appropriate sentences grounded in restorative-
justice principles will do this effectively. 
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“Few, perhaps no, judicial responsibilities are more difficult 
than sentencing. The task is usually undertaken by trial judges who 
seek with diligence and professionalism to take account of the human 
existence of the offender and the just demands of a wronged 
society.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ben’s Story2 
 
In 2008, I was a public defender in Washington, D.C., and I 
represented a sixteen-year-old boy named Ben. Charged as an adult 
in criminal court, Ben was detained prior to trial at the D.C. adult 
jail. This was Ben’s first arrest. He was charged with multiple armed 
robberies, and each robbery carried a mandatory minimum sentence 
of five years in prison. 
Ben committed the robberies with other teenagers.3 When Ben 
was arrested, he was in a car with those other teens. While the others 
all managed to run away from the police, Ben was left alone in the 
car with a sawed-off shotgun that had just been used in a robbery 
that the teens had committed together. At this time, Ben was living in 
the backseat of his mother’s car, and needed money for food. Ben 
was depressed and clinically obese, weighing over 300 pounds. 
 
 1. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2031 (2010). 
 2. At the end of the day, the criminal justice system impacts real people. It can destroy lives 
and communities, or it can help to rebuild them. Ben’s story is one of several that I will share to 
humanize otherwise abstract policy arguments. Although Ben is not his real name, every detail of 
this story is real and unchanged. 
 3. Youthful offending is often characterized by susceptibility to peer pressure. See, e.g., 
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2462 (2012); Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 
(2012); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018; Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Neither Party, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter 
Brief for the AMA et al., Miller]; Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Neither Party, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) [hereinafter Brief for 
the AMA et al., Graham]; Brief for the Am. Psychol. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) [hereinafter Brief for the 
APA et al., Graham]. 
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While I was representing Ben, my pocketbook was stolen. When 
Ben found out that I was the victim of a theft,4 he was extremely 
distressed and worried about me.5 Ben was distraught over the 
thought that someone could have threatened me with a gun and that I 
may have been hurt. For Ben, this moment when he imagined me 
being robbed at gunpoint was the moment when it all made sense. He 
said to me that he could not believe that he had robbed other people, 
strangers about whom he knew nothing, and that he could have 
robbed someone like me.6 Ben said it hurt him to imagine that 
someone could rob me and not know what a nice person I was or that 
I was the kind of person who helped other people, people like him. 
Ben felt terrible for the effect his actions had on his victims.7 He 
imagined how they must have felt scared. He understood that no one 
deserved to feel that way. Ben could also identify with a sense of 
anger the victims must have felt, for he too felt angry at whomever 
had robbed me.8 
Ben demonstrated to me that he was quite capable of reflecting 
on his behavior from a perspective of empathy for his victims, 
 
 4. It was through pure coincidence that Ben learned that I had been the victim of a theft. 
 5. This is also a story about resources and access to justice. I was a public defender at PDS, 
a well-resourced office with caseload limits that enabled me to visit Ben regularly and develop a 
relationship with him. Thus, Ben felt connected to me. This might not have happened in a system 
where attorneys do not regularly visit clients to develop relationships of trust. Nonetheless, an 
external catalyst prompted Ben’s reflections about the wrongfulness of his conduct and created 
the space for Ben to consider the impact of his behavior on his victims. 
 6. Robbery is a property offense motivated by a desire to obtain money or goods and, 
though robbery has a clear victim, it is not aimed at a person. One of the elements of robbery is 
that the property must be taken from a victim by force or fear. When Ben made the connection 
between what happened to me and what he had done to his victims, this made the robberies 
personal for Ben. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and 
Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 117 (2004) (discussing the significance of 
restorative justice when defendant tells victim that the crime was not personal and that defendant 
is sorry); see also id. at 133–34 (noting that “mediation seems to work even better to reduce 
violent crimes than property crimes” since “stronger emotions” may “produce more powerful 
remorse and empathy”). 
 7. This is the feeling of guilt. See Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA 
L. REV. 1801, 1810–11 (1999) (arguing that “guilt is the appropriate—the virtuous or morally 
decent—response to one’s wrongdoing” (footnote omitted)). 
 8. See id. at 1822–23 (arguing that in an ideal community an offender will identify with a 
victim in his community, and because that victim likely feels anger, the offender will feel anger at 
himself; “[t]his self-directed anger is guilt”). 
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internalizing the experience of his victims,9 experiencing remorse,10 
and realizing how destructive his choices were. Ben’s potential was 
obvious to me at the time; however, his potential was never realized 
through the regular course of the criminal process. 
 
 
In the years that I worked with young people accused of 
crimes—first as a teacher at a high school for adjudicated and 
criminally at-risk teenagers in the District of Columbia and then as a 
public defender in D.C.—I constantly felt that my youthful students 
and clients did not fully grasp the consequences of their actions, 
neither when they committed an offense nor when they participated 
in the juvenile or criminal court process. Subsequently, as a clinical 
law professor who supervises students in a juvenile justice clinic, I 
have had the opportunity to reflect on the nature of my current and 
former interactions with youthful offenders and to consider the 
possible implications of developmental science. I have come to think 
that there is a much more effective way to address youthful 
offending than incarceration, even when offenses are considered 
serious and violent. A more effective response will foster 
opportunities for young people in the juvenile and criminal courts in 
a way that allows them to experience the moment that Ben 
experienced and to learn from it just as Ben learned from it. By 
harnessing the opportunity for learning, the justice system has the 
power to rehabilitate valuable and promising young people. 
The goal of this Article is to offer a solution to a problem. 
Broadly defined, the problem is that incarceration is ineffective at 
rehabilitating community members who have violated the laws of 
our society. In particular, there is a significant number of youthful 
 
 9. See Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive 
Versus Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1163 (2009) (arguing that by 
“delaying apologies until after the child receives counseling, education, or mediation, the child 
has more time to appreciate the victims’ experiences and internalize moral lessons,” thereby 
creating “a greater chance that apologies will be meaningful and sincere”). 
 10. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 125–26 (stating that remorse involves an 
acknowledgement and understanding of social norms and a recognition by the offender that his 
conduct violated social norms); id. at 94–95 (arguing that judges also seem to value a 
demonstration of offender remorse because they believe it captures an offender’s capacity for 
future change). 
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offenders, like Ben, who will face a substantial period of 
incarceration under the current approach to sentencing before they 
return to society. That period of incarceration is not serving youthful 
offenders well, and it is not serving society’s ultimate goal of 
reducing recidivism. Many of those youthful offenders who are 
incarcerated for a period of time in their formative years will return 
to society ill equipped to succeed. Ultimately, they will wind up back 
behind bars throughout their adult lives. In essence, the wrong 
approach to youthful offending can lead to a lifetime spent mostly 
incarcerated—a lifetime wasted for the individual, her family, her 
community, and all of society. 
The category of youthful offenders who are the focus of this 
Article includes those both under and over the age of eighteen, 
regardless of whether their cases are processed in the juvenile or 
adult criminal justice system. For the purpose of clarity, this Article 
will refer to adolescents as those under the age of eighteen. 
Reference to the juvenile system means the juvenile delinquency 
system, which in most (but not all) states handles matters for 
individuals who are under eighteen unless those individuals are 
removed from juvenile court jurisdiction. This Article will refer to 
emerging adults, a phrase borrowed from scholar Terry A. 
Maroney,11 to refer to those over the age of eighteen and up to their 
mid-twenties. This Article will refer to fully matured adults as those 
who have reached about age twenty-five.12 References to the 
criminal justice system mean the adult criminal courts, which handle 
matters for criminal defendants aged eighteen and over, as well as for 
those who have been transferred from juvenile delinquency to adult 
criminal court. 
This Article provides a critique of the current system for 
sentencing youthful offenders in Part II. While the ineffectiveness of 
incarceration as a response to crime is a well-covered topic, 
incarceration has a uniquely detrimental impact on the specific 
category of youthful offenders whom this Article proposes to redirect 
 
 11. Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 765, 769–70 (2011). 
 12. Twenty-five is the age at which this Article chooses to define maturity because it is the 
age that science informs us that an individual’s brain is fully developed. 
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to community-based sentences rather than incarceration. 
Incarceration is not responsive to developmental science, it does not 
promote rehabilitation, and it is costly. Incarceration is simply the 
incorrect approach for community members who may outgrow their 
offending behavior and are amenable to rehabilitation in the 
community. 
Part III sets forth what is known about the developmental 
psychology and neuroscience of both adolescents and emerging 
adults. A sophisticated understanding of such science is necessary to 
understand how incorporating restorative justice as a part of 
sentencing is more responsive and developmentally appropriate than 
incarceration, not just for juvenile offenders but for all youthful 
offenders. While scholars may differ on the exact age of total brain 
maturation, they agree that it is past the age of eighteen and into the 
twenties.13 
Though perhaps not immediately obvious, this Article explains 
the connection between what developmental science tells us about 
how young people think and behave and the restorative justice 
approach to criminal justice. 
Part IV explores the promise of restorative justice and sets out a 
unique proposal for a developmentally appropriate, community-
based sentence for youthful offenders.14 Broadly defined, restorative 
 
 13. See Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child Development 
Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 39 (2009) (citing Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: 
A Theory of Development from the Late Teens through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 469,  
474–75 (2000)) (describing a distinct developmental phase of “emerging adulthood,” from 
eighteen to twenty-five, during which much identity formation occurs and certain high-risk 
behaviors are at their peak); Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than 
Adults?: Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-
Flop”, 64 AM. PSYCHOL. 583, 590–91 figs.1 & 2 (2009) (presenting research findings suggesting 
that, while cognitive maturation levels off by approximately sixteen, psychosocial maturation, 
which affects individuals’ impulse control and sensation-seeking behavior, as well as their ability 
to resist peer pressure and consider future consequences, continues through the twenties); Terry 
A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 89, 152 (2009) (“Developmental neuroscience consistently indicates that structural 
brain maturation is incomplete at age eighteen. Though estimates vary, many scientists have 
opined that structural maturation is not complete until the mid-twenties.”). Steinberg defines 
“psycho-social maturation” as involving (1) sensation-seeking; (2) capacity to resist peer 
pressure; and (3) future orientation. Steinberg et al., supra, at 588–89. 
 14. When this Article refers to a community-based sentence, it refers to a sentence of 
probation where an offender is supervised in the community, rather than a sentence of 
incarceration where an offender is removed from the community. 
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justice is a lens through which one may view the relationship 
between crime, punishment, healing, violence, humanity, causation, 
and consequence. The term restorative justice has been used with 
different, sometimes even contradictory, meanings. The type of 
restorative justice to which I refer is conferencing or mediation. It is 
the bringing together of victims and offenders in a process that 
enables each to consider the other’s plight and to come to a greater 
shared sense of understanding of the event as well as of their shared 
humanity. A restorative justice response to youthful offending 
addresses the specialized thinking deficiencies and developmental 
needs of these offenders because restorative conferencing, when 
done correctly, focuses on the participants’ understanding of the 
underlying reasons for a crime and its consequences, something that 
developing brains struggle to grasp otherwise. 
Part V addresses skeptics of the proposal and problems with 
implementation. Skeptics may have concerns about effectiveness, the 
risk posed by offenders remaining in the community, and offender 
sincerity. There are concerns about defendants’ rights and 
confidentiality. Finally, there are systemic concerns about cost, 
timing, and implementation. 
Science has enlightened even the U.S. Supreme Court regarding 
how young people have biologically limited thinking and planning 
capabilities.15 They are highly susceptible to pressure.16 They act 
impulsively, without maturely thinking about or contemplating the 
consequences of their actions and without properly weighing the 
costs and benefits associated with a particular course of action.17 
With an understanding of the implications of developmental science, 
in recent years the Court has carved out limitations on the most 
extreme sentences for juvenile offenders. In Roper v. Simmons,18 the 
Court eliminated the death penalty for juvenile offenders.19 In 
Graham v. Florida20 and Miller v. Alabama,21 the Court significantly 
 
 15. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 n.5 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011, 2026 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005). 
 16. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
 17. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). 
 18.  543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 19. Id. at 578. 
 20.  130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 21.  132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
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limited the imposition of life without the possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders.22 Further, the Court has instructed that 
penological justifications apply with lesser, and, in some instances, 
no force to adolescents.23 This Article takes the Supreme Court’s 
holdings one step further and applies the underlying developmental 
science to propose reducing sentences of incarceration in instances 
beyond only the most extreme sentences of the death penalty and life 
without the possibility of parole. 
Targeting youthful offenders and diverting them from 
incarceration when they have the potential for growth and 
rehabilitation provides the best opportunity to educate the offenders, 
reduce incarceration,24 and achieve the goal of reducing recidivism 
outcomes. Providing prosocial education to youthful offenders 
through developmentally appropriate and effective sentencing 
practices is a much more promising approach25 because they are still 
developing in ways that make them an ideal population to practice 
restorative justice mediations.26 
Restorative justice practices have been used in the United States 
and internationally for centuries. In the United States, these practices 
have predominantly been used either in a way that is totally unrelated 
to court processes to promote healing27 or in a way sanctioned by the 
 
 22. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
 23. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026); Roper, 543 U.S. at 
569–70. 
 24. See generally MARK MAUER & THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE 
(1999) (discussing increasing incarceration rates of U.S. prisons). America imprisons 1 percent of 
its adult population. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 
5 (2008). For instance, one in nine black males between the ages of twenty and thirty-four is 
incarcerated, and one in every fifteen black males aged eighteen or older is in prison or jail. Id. at 
6–7. 
 25. See Emily Buss, Rethinking the Connection Between Developmental Science and 
Juvenile Justice, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 496–97 (2009) (reviewing ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & 
LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE (2008)). 
 26.  See David E. Arredondo, Child Development, Children’s Mental Health, and the 
Juvenile Justice System: Principles for Effective Decision-Making, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 
21 (2003) (describing how, from a developmental perspective, restorative justice mediations that 
bring the offender face-to-face with their victim are “one of the most potent tools” the justice 
system has at its disposal). Arredondo states: “It teaches empathy, accountability, and compassion 
while allowing the full impact of the pain of guilt and shame to mold future behavior. It 
personalizes the system and humanizes society for the children whom the system is seeking to 
socialize.” Id. 
 27. There are programs where there is face-to-face mediation, such as between prisoners and 
victims, which takes place while inmates are serving their sentences. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra 
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justice system only as a means of diverting low-level offenders away 
from the traditional court process.28 
A specific proposal for a developmentally appropriate, 
community-based sentence for armed robbery offenders will be 
described by drawing upon restorative justice practices. This Article 
examines this approach for those offenders who have committed 
armed robbery because they demonstrate the hallmarks of immature 
thinking and because robbery offenses have clear victims. Although 
the approach may have much broader applicability—for instance to 
offenses such as felony murder—robbery offenses are a good place 
to start.29 Robbery offenders are an ideal group to target; these 
offenders are currently subjected to lengthy sentences of 
incarceration and experience high rates of recidivism and re-
incarceration. By identifying a greater number of youthful offenders 
who are receptive to intervention in the community, communities can 
divert many offenders from incarceration and improve recidivism 
outcomes.30 
 
note 6, at 123; see also Restorative Justice Project, U. OF WIS. LAW SCH., 
http://law.wisc.edu/fjr/rjp/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2013) (describing the Wisconsin program); 
History of Victim and Restorative Justice Programs, IOWA DEP’T OF CORR., 
http://www.doc.state.ia.us/VictimHistory.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (describing the Iowa 
program); Sample Restorative Justice Practices in Minnesota, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. (Aug. 22, 
2006), http://www.doc.state.mn.us/rj/publications/samples.htm (providing a list of programs in 
Minnesota). When programs are unrelated to the court process, the offender participates without 
any tangible benefit in terms of his sentence. Such practices are primarily concerned with the 
psychic healing of the victim and the offender purely for the sake of the healing. 
 28. In some places, diversionary programs implement restorative justice pretrial so that the 
offender who successfully participates will never have been in the courtroom and tried or 
adjudicated. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 122. These diversion programs tend to exist 
where the offenses are minor. See id. at 129. 
 29. While this approach could have broad applicability, it may not be appropriate for every 
type of crime or for every youthful offender. Some scholars argue that there is no evidence that 
“the crime of murder, in and of itself, is an indicator of depravity for juveniles.” Robert Johnson 
& Chris Miller, An Eighth Amendment Analysis of Juvenile Life Without Parole: Extending 
Graham to All Juvenile Offenders, 12 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG.,GENDER & CLASS 101, 122 
(2012). That said, there are certain crimes—like sex offenses—that jump out as presenting unique 
challenges. This is particularly true because most sex offenders have themselves been the victims 
of sexual violence and have been exposed at a young age to sexual examples far more 
sophisticated than those that they are able to comprehend. 
 30. These offenses—armed robbery and felony murder—are useful examples because both 
the juvenile and criminal systems currently and overwhelmingly respond to these offenses with 
secure confinement sentences, such as prison, jail, and juvenile commitment to detention 
facilities. Incarceration, however, leads to high recidivism rates of around 50 percent in various 
states across the country. See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. 
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There will necessarily be a selection process for offenders who 
should participate. When implemented as a condition of probation, 
the Proposal calls for a preparation phase for all parties, a victim-
offender conference guided by a trained mediator, and a 
postconference debriefing phase where offenders have the 
opportunity to learn from their conferencing experience. Should they 
fail on probation—by failing to participate in the restorative justice 
process, failing to follow any of the terms and conditions of their 
probation, or reoffending—offenders would face the original term of 
incarceration. Throughout this process, if further information is 
gleaned about the offender’s underlying challenges,31 the offender 
can be referred to services to meet those challenges in the 
community. By so doing, youth crime can be more effectively 
addressed in order to reform the offender, correct the behavior, and 
reduce recidivism. 
This Proposal is unique for three reasons. First, it explores 
harnessing the educational potential of restorative justice as a 
developmentally appropriate and rehabilitative tool.32 Second, it 
 
JUST., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 234 (2006), available at 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf (showing, for example, juvenile 
re-arrest rates of 55 percent in Florida, New York, and Virginia during a one-year period 
following release). One way to improve the recidivism rate is to find alternatives to incarceration 
for as many receptive adolescent offenders as possible. See OJJDP Model Programs Guide, 
Aftercare, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov 
/mpg/progTypesAftercare.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2013) (citing Howard N. Snyder and Melissa 
Sickmund for the proposition that, “[t]hough there is no national recidivism rate for juveniles, 
state studies have shown that rearrest rates for youth within 1 year of release from an institution 
average 55 percent, while reincarceration and reconfinement rates during the same timeframe 
average 24 percent,” and concluding that “[t]here is a definite need to provide systemic aftercare 
services that are designed to address reentry issues, including reoffending, that may affect a 
juvenile offender’s reintegration back into society”). 
 31. Underlying challenges refers to root causes of the offender’s problems with the criminal 
justice or the juvenile justice system, which include (but are not limited to) abuse or neglect, 
various education issues, mental health problems, or substance abuse. 
 32. This Article fully explores how restorative justice can be used as a developmentally 
appropriate sentence. Scholar Emily Buss acknowledged that restorative justice may be a 
promising developmentally appropriate practice. See Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in 
Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 52 (2003) (“Dissatisfaction with traditional juvenile court 
proceedings have led many countries, including the United States, to experiment with a form of 
restorative justice known as ‘family group conferencing,’ which brings together victim, offender, 
their two communities of support, and law enforcement to discuss the offense and its 
consequences, and to develop a plan for restitution. These proceedings, stripped of conventional 
due process protections, have proven highly successful in achieving the due process aims of 
meaningful participation, and, relatedly, respectful treatment. Offenders who play an active role 
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seeks to incorporate restorative justice into our court system by 
focusing on a concrete proposal tailored to the sentencing phase.33 
Third, and most notably, it focuses on restorative justice as a means 
of reducing incarceration for a significant category of youthful 
offenders who have been adjudicated or convicted of armed robbery, 
though this approach may also be applied to other serious offenses. 
 
II.  CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT SENTENCING APPROACH FOR 
YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS 
A.  Rethinking Incarceration as a Response to Youthful Offending 
 
This Article’s Proposal offers an alternative to incarceration.34 
The offense that this Article focuses on—armed robbery—is 
considered serious and violent. Because it is serious and violent, 
society responds with significant sentences of incarceration.35 
 
in the decisionmaking process report a high degree of satisfaction with the process and 
demonstrate their commitment to the process by fulfilling their conference-imposed obligations in 
a large percentage of cases.”); see also Arredondo, supra note 26, at 21 (describing restorative 
justice mediations as a “developmentally constructive sanction” because “[a]dolescents, often 
thoughtless and impulsive, will perpetrate a crime or prank without considering its impact on 
others. When a human face is put on the damage and suffering they have caused, they often feel 
both regret and remorse. . . . Whether they admit it or not, there often arises a genuine desire to 
make things better. . . . From a developmental point of view, this is one of the most potent tools in 
the hands of decision-makers.”) 
 33. Few programs implement restorative justice in one phase of the criminal process. Bibas 
& Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 122–24. For instance, Vermont offers an example of such a 
system with widespread restorative justice infused in the process. Id. at 122. In Vermont, there are 
two tracts: the traditional criminal justice model and a model that is the same through 
adjudication, at which point restorative justice is implemented at sentencing. Id. 
 34. This Proposal and incarceration are not necessarily mutually exclusive as a response to 
youthful offenders. Another way of incorporating restorative justice with offender sentences is to 
implement restorative justice during a sentence of incarceration. Such an approach is at odds with 
my Proposal because it is about reformation of the penal system and does not avoid many of the 
negative consequences of incarceration. 
 35. The punishment currently doled out to emerging adult offenders is incarceration. 
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), nearly 420,000 inmates as of midyear of 2009 
in the United States were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four. HEATHER C. WEST, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009 - 
STATISTICAL TABLES 20 (2010). In 2001, close to a million people were convicted of felonies in 
the state courts, and two-thirds of those convicted of state felonies were incarcerated, averaging 
more than three years in prison or jail. See Erik Luna, Introduction: The Utah Restorative Justice 
Conference, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (2003). In fact, it was estimated in 2008 that only 38.2 
percent of all inmates in all federal and state prisons were there for violent offenses. See JOHN 
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Incarceration of youthful offenders is particularly problematic 
because these offenders will serve substantial time in prison during 
their formative years and then reenter mainstream society ill-
prepared for a successful life. But incarceration simply does not 
work very well, especially with youthful offenders. Incarceration is 
not a developmentally appropriate sentence for youthful offenders.36 
The deprivation and lack of stimulation associated with the time 
spent incarcerated will hinder rather than promote a youthful 
offender’s development.37 
The major benefit to incarceration is that offenders are 
incapacitated during the time that they are locked up.38 When it 
comes to young people, the benefit of a period of incapacitation is 
small, especially when compared to the relative harm that 
incarceration creates.39 Incarceration is expensive.40 It is harmful to 
 
SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF 
INCARCERATION 9 tbl.3 (2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications 
/incarceration-2010-06.pdf. Although this article does not define violent offense, because BJS 
data was used, it can be assumed that violent offenses includes murder, non-negligent 
manslaughter, manslaughter rape, other sexual assault, robbery, assault, and other violent 
offenses. In 1997, the average sentence to be served in federal prison for adult (over eighteen) 
offenders convicted of any violent offenses (excluding those sentenced to life in prison or death) 
was 76.1 months and for those convicted of robbery was 82.6 months. WILLIAM J. SABOL, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TIME SERVED IN PRISON BY FEDERAL 
OFFENDERS, 1986–97 5 tbl.2 (June 1999). The report does not define what constitutes a violent or 
property offense. 
 36. See Johnson & Miller, supra note 29, at 109. 
 37. See Henry R. Cellini, Child Abuse, Neglect, and Delinquency: The Neurological Link, 55 
JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 6 (2004) (“The neural pathways strengthened in an abusive or neglectful 
environment are those that will prepare the child to cope in that negative environment, which 
necessarily curtails their ability to function in a positive environment.”). 
 38. Without a doubt, incarceration does incapacitate some offenders. For a sophisticated 
analysis estimating the number of crimes that may be averted by incarceration, see AVINASH 
SINGH BHATI, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., AN INFORMATION THEORETIC METHOD FOR 
ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF CRIMES AVERTED BY INCAPACITATION (2007), available at 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411478_crimes_averted.pdf. 
     39.   See Arredondo, supra note 26, at 17 n.22 (discussing the importance of taking the 
“potential harm done” by particular sanctions when choosing a developmentally appropriate 
response to children’s misbehavior). 
 40. Those proponents of a cost-benefit approach to criminal justice programs offer some 
insight into the efficacy of incarceration as compared to community interventions. Historically, 
decisions about criminal justice policies have been motivated by “political and ideological 
interests, and unscientific speculation over the causes and effects of crime.” JENNIFER 
ROSENBERG & SARA MARK, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, BALANCED 
JUSTICE: COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS & CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 2 (2011), available at 
http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Balanced_Justice.pdf. In addition to providing a 
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offenders because it is ineffective when recidivism outcomes are 
considered.41 Incarceration disproportionately impacts racial 
minorities and lower socioeconomic groups.42 It also extols a number 
of indirect human costs on offenders, their families, and their 
communities.43 There must be successful interventions with youthful 
offenders when they are young because otherwise they will enter into 
 
framework for assessing alternatives of incarceration versus community interventions like my 
Proposal, cost-benefit proponents point to a need for more research on effectiveness and impacts 
of various approaches. 
 41. Luna, supra note 35, at 2 n.9 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2001 506 tbl.6.42, 507 tbl.6.43 (Kathleen Maguire 
& Ann L. Pastore eds., 2002)). 
      42.   See id. at 3; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 57 (2010) (noting that of the over 2 million 
prisoners now behind bars, the overwhelming majority are men of color, nearly half Black men 
and 19 percent Latino men); Beth E. Richie, The Social Impact of Mass Incarceration on Women, 
in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 138 
(Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, eds., 2002) [hereinafter INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT] (noting 
that by the late 1990s two-thirds of incarcerated women were women of color); Eric Holder, 
Attorney General, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association’s House of 
Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-
speech-130812.html (“We must also confront the reality that—once they’re in that system—
people of color often face harsher punishments than their peers. One deeply troubling report, 
released in February, indicates that—in recent years—black male offenders have received 
sentences nearly 20 percent longer than those imposed on white males convicted of similar 
crimes. This isn’t just unacceptable—it is shameful.”). 
    43.   See Todd R. Clear, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES 
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 73, 138, 173, 182, 191–92 (2007) (describing how 
reduced social order related to incarceration can result in the removal of valuable assets in the 
form of wage-earners, weaker labor markets, higher crime rates and less positive informal social 
controls, a lack of trust in law enforcement as a formal social control and other civic institutions, 
increased delinquency, decreased family, social and residential stability, a reduced ability for a 
community to function collectively as a community, and numerous emotional costs to families 
and communities); George Lipsitz, “In an Avalanche Every Snowflake Pleads Not Guilty”: The 
Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration and Impediments to Women’s Fair Housing 
Rights, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1746 (2012) (linking housing and employment discrimination with 
incarceration and the impact on women of color as part of a vicious cycle of poverty, employment 
discrimination, housing discrimination, criminalization, and incarceration); Gwen Rubinstein & 
Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing-Denial of Benefits to Drug Offenders, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 42, at  37, 45 (looking at the crumbling of social networks of formerly 
incarcerated people and their relations due to excessive policing in public housing, and the harsh 
1992 welfare reform laws that resulted); Jessica Dixon Weaver, African-American 
Grandmothers: Does the Gender-Entrapment Theory Apply? Essay Response to Professor Beth 
Richie, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 153 (2011) (looking at the impact of incarceration on African-
American grandmothers, who are left caring for the children of their incarcerated sons and 
daughters, often at great personal expense and sacrifice). 
 
Spring 2013] YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS 817 
 
the adult system and perpetuate the cycle of re-offending and all of 
the associated costs of recidivism.44 
1.  The Fiscal Cost of Incarceration 
 
The majority of the offenders who commit robbery are young. 
According to statistics provided by the FBI, 64.2 percent of all 
offenders in the United States arrested for robbery were under the 
age of twenty-five in 2010.45 In 2007, 34,500 juveniles in the United 
States were arrested for robbery.46 Statistics do not differentiate 
when these robbery offenses are considered “armed.”47 
Incarceration has become an increasingly standard response to 
crime in the United States. Since the 1970s, U.S. rates of 
incarceration have quadrupled.48 Today, the United States 
incarcerates more people than any other country in the world: 
approximately 1 percent of the U.S. adult population is in prison.49 
According to the most recent census data, there are 70,792 juveniles 
 
 44. Statistics from 1999 reveal that it cost $146.6 billion in one year to support our current 
criminal justice process for offenders—from arrest to incarceration. That meant it cost every 
single American $521 per year to sustain the system. Luna, supra note 35, at 2. 
 45. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES tbl.41 (2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl41.xls. In addition, individuals under the age of 
twenty-five comprised 37.2 percent of offenders arrested for aggravated assaults; 58 percent of 
offenders arrested for burglaries; 52.7 percent of offenders arrested for larcenies (theft); 53.8 
percent of offenders arrested for motor vehicle thefts; 43.1 percent of offenders arrested for arson 
as a violent crime; and 40.2 percent of offenders arrested for other assaults. Id. 
 46. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2025 (2010). 
 47. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., supra note 45, at tbl.41. 
 48. MAUER & THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 24, at 20 fig.2-2. 
 49. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 24, at 27 (stating that for every 100,000 U.S. 
adult residents, 1,009 of them are incarcerated). As of June 2009, the total number of prisoners 
nationwide under the jurisdiction of state and federal correctional authorities was 1,617,478, with 
206,577 prisoners under federal custody and 1,410,901 under state custody. WEST, supra note 35, 
at 4. For example, in 2000, California had 163,001 prisoners; Texas had 166,719 prisoners; New 
York had 70,199 prisoners; and Vermont had 1,697 prisoners. Id. at 5. California and Texas had 
the most prisoners out of all the states. Id. 
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imprisoned in secure confinement across the United States.50 Of 
those 70,792, a total of 6,996 were imprisoned for a robbery.51 
Incarceration is expensive, regardless of whether an offender is 
housed in a juvenile facility or an adult one. The average cost to 
incarcerate a juvenile in a juvenile facility varies by jurisdiction and 
by state. The statistics available for New York are particularly 
salient. In 2009, a total of 1,468 youth under the age of twenty-one 
were admitted to the custody of the New York Office of Children 
and Family Services.52 Of those 1,468 youth, 256 were convicted of 
robbery.53 The average length of stay for all offenders admitted to 
custody was 16.6 months.54 In 2007, New York City’s Department of 
Juvenile Justice spent an annual average of $201,115 per youth in 
secure detention.55 In contrast, the annual average cost for a student 
in a New York City public high school was $11,844.56 
Taking a look at spending on juvenile incarceration across the 
entire United States, in 2007, the fifty states spent about $5.7 billion 
to imprison 64,558 youth committed to residential facilities.57 
Currently, approximately 93,000 juveniles are held in juvenile justice 
 
 50. Melissa Sickmund et al., The Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement: 1997–2010 
(2013), http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/Age_Sex.asp  (stating that of those 70,792, 
61,358 were males and 9,434 were females). 
 51. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
2010 ANNUAL REPORT 85 (2010), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/237051.pdf (reflecting 
a population of 6,576 male robbery offenders and 420 female robbery offenders). 
 52. DAVID A. PATERSON & GLADYS CARRIÓN, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & 
FAMILY SERVS., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT: YOUTH PLACED IN OCFS CUSTODY tbl.1 (2009), 
available at http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/reports/asr09.pdf. 
 53. Id. In addition to the 256 juveniles convicted of robbery admitted to the Office of 
Children and Family Services, 249 were convicted of assault, and 101 were convicted of burglary. 
Id. at 1–2. Further, in 2004, less than half of the youth in detention were charged with violent 
offenses. CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., JUVENILE DETENTION IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/detention_fact_2007.pdf.  
 54. PATERSON & CARRIÓN, supra note 52, at tbl.7. 
 55. CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 53, at 1. New York spends approximately $170 
million in a year on its twenty-one juvenile facilities. Editorial, Two Words: Wasteful and 
Ineffective, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at A22. 
 56. CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 53, at 1. 
 57. RICHARD A. MENDEL, THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE CASE 
FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 19–20 (2011), available at http://www.aecf.org/ 
~/media/Pubs/Topics/Juvenile%20Justice/Detention%20Reform/NoPlaceForKids/JJ_NoPlaceFor
Kids_Full.pdf; JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE COSTS OF CONFINEMENT: WHY GOOD JUVENILE 
JUSTICE POLICIES MAKE GOOD FISCAL SENSE 1 (2009), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org 
/images/upload/09_05_REP_CostsofConfinement_JJ_PS.pdf. 
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facilities throughout the United States.58 Some juveniles are detained 
pretrial, and about 70 percent of these juveniles are held in state-
funded, post-adjudication, residential facilities.59 According to 2008 
data from the American Correctional Association, it cost about 
$240.99 per day, or about $88,000 per year, to incarcerate a juvenile 
in a residential facility.60 Some states report costs as high as $726 per 
day, or about $265,000, per year to incarcerate a juvenile in a 
residential facility.61 
Adult incarceration is also expensive. Indeed, this Proposal also 
targets adolescents charged as adults or currently in the category of 
emerging adult offenders. Because they are processed through the 
adult system and are housed in adult prisons and jails, examining the 
costs of adult incarceration is thus necessary. Further, adult statistics 
are important because this Proposal seeks to deter offenders from 
being incarcerated when they are young. If sentenced to terms of 
incarceration at this age, these offenders will be far more likely to 
recidivate and face high rates of re-incarceration as adults. 
The average cost to incarcerate an adult in prison or jail varies 
by jurisdiction, with differences among states as well as between 
state and federal facilities. In the 2009 fiscal year, the average cost of 
incarcerating a federal inmate was $25,251.62 The average adult 
robbery offender sentenced to robbery in the federal system was 
sixty-nine months in 2003.63 That reflects a cost of $1.7 million for 
the duration of the sentence per prisoner in the federal system. In 
 
 58. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 57, at 1. 
 59. Id.; MENDEL, supra note 57, at 19–20. 
 60. ANNIE BALCK, NAT’L JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, THE REAL COSTS AND BENEFITS 
OF CHANGE: FINDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM DURING DIFFICULT FISCAL TIMES 13 
(2010), available at http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/270/The_Real_Costs_and_ 
Benefits_of_Change_Finding_Opportunities_for_Reform_During_Difficult_Fiscal_Times.pdf. 
 61. Id. at 13 n.81. In California, for instance, there are 8,955 juvenile offenders in custody in 
secure confinement. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 57, at 4. The per diem daily cost of 
locking up one young person in a California juvenile facility starts at $67.51 compared to $24.44 
in Wyoming and $726 in Connecticut. Id. Therefore, based on the total population of juveniles 
confined, California taxpayers are spending $604,552.05 per day on juveniles in detention. Id. 
 62. Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 76 Fed. Reg. 6161 (Feb. 3, 
2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-02-03/pdf/2011-2363.pdf; Luna, 
supra note 35, at 2. 
 63. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2003 110 
(2005), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs03.pdf. The report does not define what 
constitutes a violent or property offense. 
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2009, 21,332 inmates were convicted of robbery in California.64 In 
2010, adults sentenced in California adult court served an average of 
55.1 months for robbery offenses.65 It costs approximately $47,000 
per year to incarcerate an inmate in California.66 It thus costs, on 
average, $215,808.33 to incarcerate a prisoner convicted of robbery 
in California for his or her sentence. On the whole, incarceration is a 
very expensive policy and, as an examination of its harmful impacts 
reveals, it is not effective. 
2.  Incarceration Is Particularly Ineffective when 
Recidivism Outcomes and Far-Reaching Social Costs Are 
Considered 
 
Recidivism outcomes for juveniles reentering the community 
after a period of detention in a securely confined juvenile facility are 
poor. Most juveniles who have been released from secure facilities 
had been previously arrested and detained for a previous offense.67 
The severity of the new offenses, for the most part, remains 
consistent with that of previous offenses: “[a]mong youth who were 
previously in custody and released and subsequently reoffended, 18 
[percent] committed offenses that were more serious than their 
previous offense, 40 [percent] committed offenses at the same 
 
 64. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS & PAROLEES 2009 16 tbl.8 
(2010), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/offender_information_services 
_branch/Annual/CalPris/CALPRISd2009.pdf. 
 65. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., TIME SERVED ON PRISON SENTENCE: FELONS FIRST 
RELEASED TO PAROLE BY OFFENSE CALENDAR YEAR 2010 2 tbl.1 (2011), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/offender_information_services_branch/Annual/TIME6 
/TIME6d2010.pdf. 
 66. California Criminal Justice FAQ: How Much Does It Cost to Incarcerate an Inmate?, 
CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, http://www.lao.ca.gov/laoapp/laomenus/sections 
/crim_justice/6_cj_inmatecost.aspx?catid=3 (last visited Mar. 27, 2013) (based on data from 
2008–09). 
 67. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 30, at 232 (stating that according to 2003 surveys of 
youth who were reentering the community after some period of detention in a secure facility, 
“youth reentry candidates said they had at least one prior commitment (62 [percent]). When asked 
about prior convictions and prior custody experiences, about a quarter (23 [percent]) said they had 
been convicted of an offense but had not been in custody before their current placement. Some 
had been in custody before, but had not been convicted before (6 [percent]) and some said that 
they had not been convicted or in custody before (8 [percent]). Among those who had been in 
custody before, 2 in 10 said they had been in custody only once before, 4 in 10 said they had been 
held 2–4 times, and 4 in 10 said they had been held 5 or more times before.”). 
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severity level, and 24 [percent] committed offenses that were less 
serious than their prior offense.”68 There is no national statistic for 
the juvenile offender recidivism rate.69 
The simple, bleak, and immutable fact is that most adult 
offenders who spend time in jail and prison return to prison. In 
California, former prisoners experience a particularly high recidivism 
rate—as high as 75 percent for adult former prisoners over a one-
year period.70 Between 2004 and 2007, over 567,000 people across 
the United States were released from adult state prisons.71 Over 43 
percent of those 567,000 released prisoners found themselves back 
behind bars within that three year time period.72 
Recidivism rates can be measured in different ways. They can 
be measured by who is re-arrested, who violates probation or parole, 
whose re-arrest results in a conviction, or who is re-incarcerated. It is 
frightening that over 43 percent of people released from jail or prison 
are re-incarcerated. In effect, this means that almost half of our 
population of offenders nationwide is failing in the community to 
such an incredible extent that we must re-examine the efficacy and 
ubiquity of U.S. incarceration policies. The best way to reduce 
recidivism for this high percentage of offenders73 is to keep them out 
of prison and jail in the first place. 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. For a state-by-state comparison of recidivism rates, see id. at 234–35. 
 70. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 2011 ADULT INSTITUTIONS OUTCOME EVALUATION 
REPORT 13 (2011), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/adult_research_branch/Research_ 
Documents/ARB_FY_0607_Recidivism_Report_(11-23-11).pdf. Additionally, there is an overall 
65.1 percent recidivism rate for adult former prisoners in California over a three-year period. Id. 
at 12. In response to a 67 percent recidivism rate in California, the state adopted a three strikes 
law, which required courts to impose a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence on any offender 
convicted of any felony if the offender has two prior serious or violent offenses. Ewing v. 
California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003). On his third strike, Mr. Ewing stole about $1,200 worth of 
golf clubs. Id. at 28. The law functioned such that Mr. Ewing was incarcerated for twenty-five 
years to life. The Court upheld the challenge brought under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause. Id. at 30–31. In 2012, California voters passed a referendum to limit 
the applicability of third strike sentencing enhancements to serious and violent offenses. See Jack 
Leonard, Prop. 36 Seeks to Ease California’s Three-Strikes Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/27/local/la-me-prop36-3strikes-20121028. 
 71. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF 
AMERICA’S PRISONS 10–11 exhibit 1 (2011). 
 72. Id. 
 73. In 2009, a total of 730,860 individuals were admitted into prison—56,153 were admitted 
in federal prisons and 674,707 were admitted in state prisons. HEATHER C. WEST ET AL., BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2009 4 tbl.2 (2010). As of 2009, 
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There are a number of reasons why offenders who have spent 
time in prison and jail recidivate. Of the many factors that contribute 
to recidivism, some are by-products of incarceration, and others are 
by-products of the environments from which offenders came and to 
which they later return.74 In prison and jail, inmates either do not 
have access to, or have limited access to, services such as counseling, 
mental health treatment, substance abuse therapy, vocational 
development, and education.75 When released, many former inmates 
have undiagnosed or untreated mental health conditions.76 
Insufficient treatment raises the risk that an offender will return to 
criminal behavior upon his or her release.77 
While incarcerated, inmates do not learn to live by the rules that 
they are expected to abide by in a harmonious and peaceful 
 
Texas had 171,219 prisoners under its jurisdiction; California had 171,215 prisoners; New York 
had 58,681; and Vermont had 2,220. Id. at 16 app. tbl.1. 
 74. See CATHY S. WIDOM & MICHAEL G. MAXFIELD, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN 
BRIEF: AN UPDATE ON THE “CYCLE OF VIOLENCE” 1 (2001). For instance, there is a connection 
between recidivism and the cycle of violence. A series of ongoing studies (sponsored by the 
National Institute of Justice, the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, and the 
National Institute of Mental Health) examine the lives of 1,575 child victims of abuse and neglect 
identified in court cases of abuse and neglect dating from 1967 to 1971. Id. at 2. This study 
looked at offenders in their twenties and thirties. Id. By 1994, almost half of the victims (most of 
whom were then in their late twenties and early thirties) had been arrested for some type of non-
traffic offense. Id. at 7. Eighteen percent had been arrested for a violent crime—an increase of 4 
percent in the six years since arrest records were first checked. Id. at 3. Rates of arrest were at 
least 25 percent higher among black victims. Id. at 4–5. Another key finding was that neglected 
children’s rates of arrest for violence were almost as high as physically abused children’s. Id. at 5. 
Neglect was defined in the study as an excessive failure by caregivers to provide food, clothing, 
shelter, and medical attention. Id. at 3. 
 75. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011) (affirming the lower court’s ruling in two 
long-running cases in which the medical and mental health care provided in California’s prisons 
was found to be so deficient that it endangers the lives of prisoners and violates the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); see also ROSENBERG & MARK, 
supra note 40, at 7 (noting that traditional incarceration may not adequately address and treat an 
offender’s substance abuse problems). 
 76. See, e.g., JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, THE COMM’N ON SAFETY 
& ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT 38 (2006) (stating that every 
year, more than 1.5 million people are released from jail and prison with a life-threatening 
contagious disease, and at least 350,000 prisoners have serious mental illness); Ingrid A. 
Binswanger et al., Release from Prison—A High Risk of Death for Former Inmates, 356 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 157, 157 (2007) (discussing a study of the risk of death for former Washington 
State prison inmates, which found, during their first two weeks of release, former inmates had a 
risk of death that was 12.7 percent higher than other Washington State residents––the leading 
causes of inmate deaths were drug overdose, cardiovascular disease, homicide, and suicide). 
 77. ROSENBERG & MARK, supra note 40, at 7. 
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community; rather, they are forced to live in a prison society whose 
rules are as close to the polar opposite of mainstream America’s.78 
Prisoners are not treated as anyone would want valued members of 
our society to be treated—at best prisoners are subjected to extreme 
overcrowding,79 suffer inadequate medical and mental health care,80 
and receive the discouraging message that they are not valued as 
individuals.81 At worst, they are likely to be victims of physical and 
sexual violence, they are likely to witness violence, and they have a 
higher rate of suicide and other acts of self-harm while 
incarcerated.82 Even correctional guards charged with the duty of 
keeping facilities safe have allowed or instigated extreme fighting 
between inmates.83 This type of inhumane treatment promotes 
feelings of isolation from the community in prisoners and contributes 
to the failure of American jails and prisons to treat the root causes of 
offending. Further, the harm of incarceration disproportionately 
 
 78. See CRAIG HANEY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
IMPACT OF INCARCERATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR POST-PRISON ADJUSTMENT 17 (2001), 
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/prison2home02/haney.pdf (“[T]he less like a prison, and the 
more like the freeworld, the better”). 
 79. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1947; Luna, supra note 35, at 2. Over the last thirty years, 
California’s prisoner population has increased by a factor of eight while there has been no 
comparable increase in funds. HANEY, supra note 78, at 3. In Texas and California, federal courts 
have found that prison systems have failed to provide adequate treatment services for prisoners 
who have suffered the most extreme psychological effects of confinement in deteriorated and 
overcrowded conditions. Id. 
 80. HANEY, supra note 78, at 3–4 (referencing that psychological and physical isolation 
from the surrounding community, compromised visitation programs, and scarce resources result 
in greater psychological distress and potential dysfunction of inmates). 
 81. See id. at 9. 
 82. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1924. 
 83. See Plair v. City of New York, 789 F. Supp. 2d 459, 461–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(discussing allegations that officers at Rikers Island Detention Center repeatedly attacked inmates 
and encouraged gang violence); see also HANEY, supra note 78, at 4 (explaining that the 
overcrowding due to the massive increase in the population of prisoners has led to staff shortages 
and a “de-skilling” of some correctional staff members who then use extreme prison discipline, 
which causes increased fear and danger for inmates); Luna, supra note 35, at 4 n.20 (discussing 
the staging of prisoner fights by guards); Colin Moynihan, Two Officers Sentenced in Rikers 
Island Assault Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, at A17 (discussing two officers charged, among 
a group of fifteen people involved, with assaulting youth inmates); Isolde Raftery, 6-Year 
Sentence for Guard in Rikers Island Beatings, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2010, at A14 (discussing a 
guard sentenced to six years imprisonment for beating youth inmates). 
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impacts already vulnerable and marginalized groups like the poor or 
racial and ethnic minorities.84 
Inmates subsisting in such environments cannot be expected to 
leave incarceration better suited for life in mainstream America than 
they were at the beginning of their term of incarceration. Time in 
prison may increase an offender’s exposure to more sophisticated 
criminal knowledge and a criminal network.85 It may also lead to a 
greater propensity for violence.86 Years of separation strain family 
ties, the strength of which is a strong indicator that one will not 
recidivate.87 Former inmates are challenged by inadequate support 
during the reentry process, few legitimate job prospects as a convict 
with a record, and a society that has changed and grown without 
them.88 
 
 84. The American criminal justice system treats offenders of different races and 
socioeconomic statuses differently. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 209–48 (2010). As a result, American prisons 
and jails are disproportionately filled with African Americans, Latinos, and the poor. WEST, 
supra note 35, at 19 tbl.16; Luna, supra note 35, at 2 n.8. In 2009, 39 percent of the inmates in 
state and federal prison were black, and 21 percent were Hispanic. WEST, supra note 35, at 21 
tbl.18. In addition, 61 percent of the Hispanics and 49 percent of the blacks in the United States 
are likely to be low-income. Id. Perhaps one of the most stark statistics is that one in three African 
American males in America today is under some form of court supervision—whether that is 
incarceration in prison or jail, probation, or parole. ALEXANDER, supra, at 9; see also Dorothy E. 
Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1294, 1300 (2004) (noting that entire neighborhoods associated with crime 
and incarceration may also suffer employment discrimination or reduced economic opportunity, 
and affirming three main harms of mass incarceration to Black communities: damage to social 
networks, distortion of social norms, and destruction of social citizenship, leaving them 
disenfranchised and unable to contest unjust policies). 
 85. ROSENBERG & MARK, supra note 40, at 7 n.29. 
 86. Id. at 7 n.30. 
 87. JAMES AUSTIN, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ALTERNATIVES TO SECURE DETENTION 
AND CONFINEMENT OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS 2–3 (2005), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/ojjdp/208804.pdf; BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, 
THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND 
OTHER SECURE FACILITIES 2 (2006), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/ 
upload/06-11_REP_DangersOfDetention_JJ.pdf; Carl S. Taylor, Growing Up Behind Bars: 
Confinement, Youth Development, and Crime, J. OKLA. CRIM. JUST. RES., Aug. 1996, at 29, 35–
36, available at http://www.doc.state.ok.us/offenders/ocjrc/96/Growing%20Up%20Behind%20 
Bars.pdf; see also Donald Braman, Families and Incarceration, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT,, 
supra note 42, at 117, 121, 128, 129–31, 133, 135 (explaining how absences due to incarceration 
break social bonds of extended kinship and friendship networks, which make up communities and 
reduce family stability, and how families and communities are burdened with the “stigma of 
criminality”). 
 88. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 955–62 (2003); see 
also Donna Coker, Foreword: Addressing the Real World of Racial Injustice in the Criminal 
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Often these individuals have difficulty finding legitimate work 
when released back into the community.89 Those who cannot obtain 
and maintain employment are at greater risk of winding up back 
behind bars.90 Former inmates are sometimes—but not always—
offered reentry programs.91 Unfortunately, there is no indication that 
these reentry programs work to reduce recidivism.92 The better tactic 
is to provide pre-entry services—services provided before an 
offender ever enters jail or prison in the first place—to as many 
offenders as possible. 
The harm of incarceration reaches beyond those who are 
incarcerated. It has ripple effects that permeate society—children 
grow up without their fathers, communities lose role models, 
workforces become debilitated, and a group of poor people of color 
becomes disenfranchised, disempowered, and ostracized.93 Many 
former inmates are released back into their communities with 
children who have been growing up without their fathers and 
 
Justice System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 839, 841 (2003) (discussing “social 
disorganization in already troubled neighborhoods” as a consequence of long-term incarceration 
for communities of color and observing that ex-felons who return to their communities are further 
penalized by government restrictions on their ability to vote and receive financial aid and welfare 
assistance for their children or public housing). 
 89. Pager, supra note 88, at 939. 
 90. In 2003, unemployed offenders under the supervision of the U.S. Probation and Pretrial 
Services System had their probation revoked “at a rate that was more than 500 percent higher 
than that for those who were employed.” John Rakis, Improving the Employment Rates of Ex-
Prisoners Under Parole, FED. PROBATION, June 2005, at 7, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/PPS/Fedprob/2005-06/employment.html. 
 91. In California, where inmates are being released early due to realignment, some inmates 
are not receiving post-release support in the form of probation or parole supervision. See 
Frequently Asked Questions, CALREALIGNMENT.ORG, http://www.calrealignment.org/site-
feeds.html (last visited July 31, 2013). In 1983 Florida effectively abolished all parole and any 
form of supervised release upon termination of a prison sentence. See Parole, Florida Parole 
Commission, https://fpc.state.fl.us/Parole.htm (last visited July 31, 2013). 
 92. Shelley Johnson Listwan et al., How to Prevent Prisoner Re-Entry Programs from 
Failing: Insights from Evidence-Based Corrections, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 2006, at 19, 20, 
available at http://www.uc.edu/content/dam/uc/ccjr/docs/articles/reentry_from_failing_fed_ 
prob.pdf (“We still know relatively little about the overall effectiveness of parole, and even less 
about the effectiveness of the ‘newer’ re-entry programs.”).  
 93. Indeed, the purpose of crime control policies generally should be to “reintegrate 
offenders into society rather than shame them in an unproductive and alienating fashion.” Darryl 
K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1295, 1352 (2001). 
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mothers.94 Though the former inmates may want to support their 
families, be with their families, and “do the right thing,” they face 
obstacles to achieving those goals. The difficulty that former inmates 
experience readjusting to society is felt not only by them as 
individuals but also by their families. Children and spouses of 
offenders suffer psychosocial effects from missing a parent or 
spouse.95 For example, “Parental imprisonment . . . increases 
dramatically the likelihood that children will develop antisocial-
delinquent behavior.”96 In one study, children whose parents had a 
history of incarceration had a 340 percent higher chance of 
delinquent behavior as compared to children whose parents had no 
history of incarceration.97 
There is also a financial impact on children and families of 
incarcerated offenders. Over half of adult prisoners are the parents of 
minor children.98 A 2003 survey on juvenile reentry candidates found 
that one in eleven juveniles had children of their own.99 Fathers and 
mothers cannot support their children financially while they are 
serving time in jail,100 and they have a hard time finding work after 
release because they face the job market with a criminal record.101 
Thus, the harm of incarceration as a punishment does not just impact 
the offender: it also impacts children, families, and communities, 
 
 94. MARK LEVIN, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE JUSTICE, TEX. PUB. POLICY FOUND., POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE: TREATING TEXAS CRIME VICTIMS AS CONSUMERS OF JUSTICE 1 (2010), available 
at http://www.texaspolicy.com/sites/default/files/documents/2010-03-PP03-victimsconsumers-
ml.pdf. 
 95. ROSENBERG & MARK, supra note 40, at 7–8. 
 96. Id. at 15 n.33. 
 97. Id. 
 98. “An estimated 809,800 prisoners of the 1,518,535 held in the nation’s prisons at midyear 
2007 were parents of minor children, or children under age 18.” LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. 
MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: 
PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 1 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf. 
 99. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 30, at 233. 
 100. Prisoners are very poorly paid for work, and thus prison work is not a good source of 
income to meet financial obligations like child support. Section III: The Prison Economy, PRISON 
POLICY INITIATIVE, http://www.prisonpolicy.org/prisonindex/prisonlabor.html (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2013) (noting the pay scale for federal prisoners who work outside of UNICOR in prison 
maintenance, in dollars per hour: $0.12–$0.40); see also LEVIN, supra note 94, at 1 (“[T]he 
average [Texas] inmate who leaves prison owing child support is more than $16,000 in arrears, 
making these children secondary victims of crime and an overreliance on incarceration.”). 
 101. Pager, supra note 88, at 943. 
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perpetuating the cycle of poverty and violence.102 Not surprisingly, 
these impacts are greater on the poor and minority populations.103 
Certainly, communities who see their members arrested and 
incarcerated at high rates may perceive a lack of fairness in the 
application of our laws, develop a diminished respect for the law, 
and sense ulterior motives of law enforcement because of the 
disproportionate impact on the poor and minorities.104 Further, 
children in these communities may not have the hopes and visions 
for their futures that society would ideally like to instill because they 
were robbed of role models. 
The ineffectiveness of incarceration at reducing recidivism, 
addressing the underlying challenges of offenders, and preparing 
inmates to succeed in mainstream society, as well as the high cost 
and the negative impact on families and communities, all weigh in 
favor of avoiding incarceration as a response to youthful offending. 
The way to improve outcomes is to find alternatives to incarceration 
early and for as many offenders who are receptive. 
B.  Conundrum at Sentencing Phase: The False Sorting Problem 
 
Inmates are incarcerated when they are held in jail pretrial and 
when they serve prison sentences after a conviction. Unfortunately, 
the sentencing process is flawed. It is often focused, mistakenly so, 
on the task of sorting offenders into two groups: (1) those who will 
not reoffend, and thus should remain in the community; and (2) those 
who are likely to reoffend, and thus should be incarcerated.105 
 
 102. See ROSENBERG & MARK, supra note 40, at 8; RICHARD J. BONNIE, ET AL., NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH 2-11 
(2012) (“[P]ublic safety and the reduction of crime continue to be critically important policy 
objectives, but policy makers increasingly believe that incarceration may not be an effective 
means of accomplishing these goals with many youth.”). 
 103. See ROSENBERG & MARK, supra note 40, at 9. 
 104. See Buss, supra note 13, at 62–64. 
 105. Sentencing practices are highly influenced by a judge’s subjective view of how 
remorseful an offender is. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 91, 104–07 (calling our system a 
“punishment assembly line”). The flaw in sorting is that judges cannot accurately gauge sincerity 
and depth of expression of remorse contained in an apology. Id. at 105 n.74. Yet, remorse is 
related to how an offender is viewed by a sentencer: an offender who demonstrates remorse is not 
viewed as lost. Rather, he is deemed to have the capacity for self-transformation and deserving of 
lesser punishment. Id. at 94. The more remorseful an offender appears, the more amenable to 
rehabilitation he is perceived to be, id. at 94 n.26, and thus deserving of a lesser punishment. Id. 
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Discussing juvenile life without the possibility of parole (JLWOP) in 
Graham, Justice Kennedy wrote about what may be termed a sorting 
problem and acknowledged how difficult it is to divine a juvenile 
offender’s potential for future growth and redemption at the time of 
sentencing:106 “[I]t does not follow,” said Justice Kennedy, “that 
courts taking a case-by-case proportionality approach could with 
sufficient accuracy distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile 
offenders from the many that have the capacity for change.”107 
In Roper, Justice Kennedy offered a similar statement: “It is 
difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient 
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
irreparable corruption.”108 Indeed, research bears out that “the vast 
majority of youthful offenders will desist from criminal behavior in 
adulthood. And the malleability of adolescence means that there is 
no reliable way to identify the minority who will not.”109 
The sorting problem Justice Kennedy describes in the context of 
extreme sentences of JLWOP and the death penalty is not unique to 
those punishments. Indeed, this sorting problem is ubiquitous, 
appearing in every court where a youthful offender is sentenced. In 
particular, judges have difficulty reconciling what we now know 
about adolescent development and brain maturation generally with 
 
at 95. Indeed, an apology is often viewed as a proxy for how bad an individual offender is. Id. at 
88. 
 106. The term juvenile is used here because that is what Justice Kennedy uses to refer to those 
under the age of eighteen. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
 107. Id. at 2032. 
 108. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). The court goes on to finish the thought as 
related to medical diagnosis: “As we understand it, this difficulty underlies the rule forbidding 
psychiatrists from diagnosing any patient under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, a 
disorder also referred to as psychopathy or sociopathy, and which is characterized by callousness, 
cynicism, and contempt for the feelings, rights, and suffering of others.” Id. 
 109. Brief for the APA et al., Graham, supra note 3, at 4; see TONY WARD & SHADD 
MARUNA, REHABILITATION 13 (2007) (stating that over 85 percent of people stop committing 
crimes by the age of twenty-eight); see also MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A 
GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 124–25 (1990) (describing this pattern of desisting from criminal 
activity by the late twenties as an age-crime curve and that criminologists have found that this 
pattern has remained relatively unchanged for over 150 years). 
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the behavior and actions of each individual youthful offender who 
comes before them for sentencing.110 
As a general matter, science has informed the actors in criminal 
and juvenile courts that youthful offenders have greater potential for 
growth and that their mistakes may be the result of an evolving 
identity rather than an intrinsically bad character.111 Sentencers 
constantly grapple with determining what portion of blame should be 
attributed to the offender’s state of development and what portion 
should be attributable to the offender’s personal, immutable 
characteristics. It is indeed a difficult, if not impossible, analysis in 
practice, and it is made even more challenging by limited data points. 
In addition to having incomplete information, the judges who 
impose sentences are human, fallible, and of differing personal views 
on the general capacity of all humans to grow and change. They are 
also presented with information from opposing viewpoints. Defense 
attorneys comb through their clients’ lives looking for 
demonstrations of remorse, potential for rehabilitation, connections 
to the community, and past personal tragedies that can provide 
context to a poor decision as an aberration rather than a 
demonstration of a character flaw. Prosecutors try to fairly represent 
the interests of the victim and the community as a whole when they 
do not know the defendant aside from a criminal history score or rap 
sheet listing a litany of the defendant’s past misdeeds. What results 
in court at sentencing is a contest: the defense wants the judge to see 
the defendant as redeemable, and the prosecution wants the judge to 
see the defendant as irredeemable. The judge then attempts to sort. 
The judge, like the prosecutor, does not know the defendant and is 
concerned about being held responsible if a defendant re-offends. All 
too often, because of these limitations and pressures, a judge is 
tempted to err on the side of incarceration. While incarceration may 
be a short-term fix to incapacitate a defendant and prevent re-
 
 110. Maroney, supra note 13, at 94 (arguing that science at sentencing supports only 
probabilistic generalizations). Indeed, Emily Buss also argues that one of the limitations or 
drawbacks of science is the “elusive promise of perfectly described and coherently applied 
capacities,” when really these are just generalizations. Buss, supra note 13, at 15. 
 111. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27; 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70, 573; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 25, at 38, 44–50, 52. 
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offense, in the long-term, it seems to be a contributing factor to, if 
not a leading outright cause of, recidivism. 
At sentencing, there are three main obstacles to fashioning a 
sentence that can accurately take into account a given offender’s 
potential: (1) timing; (2) lack of procedural opportunities for 
offender education and reflection; and (3) lack of realistic promise of 
the system’s guidance in procuring redemption.112 
First, sentencing occurs some time after the actual offense. If 
little time has passed between an offense and the offender’s 
sentencing, there has not been much time for an offender to grow or 
demonstrate growth. On the other hand, if a significant period of 
time has passed, the offender seems more grown up and 
sophisticated at sentencing than she or he actually was when the 
offense occurred.113 With youthful offenders, time may have more of 
a significant impact. For children who are facing transfers to adult 
court, the impact of time is evident. Children grow quickly and often 
in spurts. If the offender was fourteen at the time of an offense, she 
or he may look and seem much older if the sentencing hearing is one 
year later when she or he is fifteen.114 For children transferred to the 
adult system, a significant lapse of time between the offense and the 
ultimate sentence is common.115 It may be harder for a sentencing 
judge to appreciate one year later just how young the offender was at 
the time of the offense116—this difficulty is compounded if the 
 
 112. Certainly there are other challenges at sentencing that lead to imperfect sentences. 
Judges tend to reward guilty pleas with lesser sentences. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 
142. Judges are influenced by the wishes of victims. See id. at 136–40. In juvenile court, victims 
also influence judges in their sentencing decisions. Henning, supra note 9, at 1139–40. 
 113. The typical time period from arrest to sentencing is 265 days for felons; 505 days for 
murderers; and 348 days for those convicted of sexual assault. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 - STATISTICAL TABLES 
(2009), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/ascii/fssc06st.txt. For the typical time period from 
arrest to sentencing for all different types of crimes committed, see UNIV. AT ALBANY, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 453 (2003), available at http://www.albany.edu 
/sourcebook/pdf/t550.pdf. 
 114. For example, at the time of the crime in 1999, Jackson was fourteen years old. Because 
Jackson’s transfer to adult court was appealed before a jury heard the case, three years had passed 
before it reached the Court of Appeals of Arkansas. See Jackson v. State, No. CA 02-535, 2003 
WL 193412, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2003). 
 115. See UNIV. AT ALBANY, supra note 113, at 453 tbl.5.50. 
 116. For an incredible demonstration of this challenge, see Kate Zernike, Man, 52, Is 
Convicted as a Juvenile in a 1976 Murder, Creating a Legal Tangle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, 
at A19. 
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offense involves youthful characteristics such as peer pressure, 
impulsive thinking, and lack of forethought to appreciate and weigh 
risks. 
Second, the criminal justice system’s procedures lack systemic 
opportunities in the time period between the offense and sentencing 
to promote offender self-reflection, education, or treatment. While 
the criminal justice system expects and, at times, rewards an 
offender’s demonstration of remorse and maturity at sentencing,117 
the process does not, by design or in function, promote opportunities 
for the development of offender remorse and reflection. Further, 
offenders are at a disadvantage when it comes to accurately 
expressing themselves at a sentencing hearing.118 The first two 
obstacles result in a hearing in which the sentencing court has an 
inaccurate picture of the offender’s future potential. 
Third, speaking realistically, no sentencer can be confident that 
an offender sentenced to some term of incarceration will be provided 
the tools, treatment, opportunity, and environment necessary to 
redeem him or herself.119 The third obstacle is the problem with 
 
 117. See Henning, supra note 9, at 1148. 
 118. Indeed, the justice system, and court hearings in particular, do not promote offender 
reflection or expression of remorse. This can be a challenge especially at sentencing hearings. Id. 
at 1150.  
Physical and procedural barriers in the courtroom further impede meaningful 
expression and experiences of remorse and apology. The courtroom, for example, is 
rarely set up to facilitate true eye-to-eye contact between the offender and the victim 
and does not provide the child with a safe space in which to explore or experience 
remorse. The parties, who generally speak to the judge instead of each other, are 
constrained by the limits of the court’s time and have little or no meaningful 
opportunity to understand the other’s plight and emotions. The offending child may 
also feel embarrassed, humiliated, or ostracized in court under the intimidating gaze 
and judgment of the prosecutor, judge, victim, and even his own family. 
Id. (footnote omitted); accord Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 98 (discussing likely 
emotions of defendants at sentencing); Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and 
Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1176 (2002) (discussing subjective costs associated with 
apology). 
 119. U.S. jails and prisons are short on services. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 
1947 (2011) (affirming the lower court’s ruling in two long-running cases in which the medical 
and mental health care provided in California’s prisons was found to be so deficient that it 
endangered the lives of prisoners and violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment); see also ROSENBERG & MARK, supra note 40, at 7 (discussing how 
traditional incarceration may not adequately address and treat an offender’s substance abuse 
problems). Indeed, the purpose of crime control policies generally should be to “reintegrate 
offenders into society rather than shame them in an unproductive, alienating fashion.” Brown, 
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incarceration as it exists today in the United States. Even if an 
offender’s potential could be accurately gleaned through the 
sentencing process, the state of American incarceration undermines 
the confidence of any sentencer that a sentence could be tailored to 
address that individual offender’s potential for growth. 
This Article proposes a shift in sentencing’s focus away from 
sorting and towards practices focused on an offender’s potential for 
change and growth based upon information gleaned from 
developmental psychology and neuroscience. The Proposal reflects 
both a concern to treat youthful offenders fairly and society’s 
commitment to help its youngest members grow into thoughtful, 
mature, and law-abiding adult citizens. 
III.  DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 
EXPLAIN HOW ADOLESCENTS THINK AND BEHAVE 
A.  Overview 
The phrase adolescent development refers to the psychosocial 
science discipline of understanding norms in adolescent behavior and 
thinking. Adolescent development describes what milestones in 
thinking and behavior are associated with a particular age group.120 
Developmental psychology informs an understanding of typical or 
normative teenage thinking and behavior and takes into account 
differences in cognitive ability (thinking and planning), psychosocial 
(emotional and social) development, and identity development.121 
The phrase brain development refers to the neuroscientific study of 
how a typical brain matures over time.122 Specifically, brain 
development has two important components: structure and 
 
supra note 93, at 1352. Two authors call our system a “punishment assembly line.” Bibas & 
Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 125. 
 120. Maroney, supra note 13, at 95–96; see Nicholas Hobbs & Sally Robinson, Adolescent 
Development and Public Policy, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 212, 213–16 (1982) (explaining how 
researchers believed that “by the adolescent years, it is too late to make any difference” in the 
cognitive development of young people); id. at 217–18; ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH 
AND CRISIS 128–35 (1968); BÄRBEL INHELDER & JEAN PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL 
THINKING: ROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE 344–50 (Anne Parsons & Stanley Milgram 
trans., 8th ed. 1958); LAWRENCE KOHLBERG & ELLIOT TURIEL, MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
MORAL EDUCATION (G. Lesser ed., 1971). 
 121. See Maroney, supra note 13, at 95–102. 
 122. See id. at 92–93. 
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function.123 These two components interrelate to explain the full 
picture of brain maturation. Brain development is not always linear, 
which means that at some points in the brain’s growth, even as an 
individual is aging, his or her brain will be prone to greater 
deficiencies than it was at an even younger age.124 Moreover, 
adolescent development and brain science make the most sense when 
understood in an integrated discussion, as the findings in one 
discipline are complementary to and corroborative of the findings in 
the other. 
B.  Developmental Psychology: Cognitive, Psychosocial, and Identity 
Development 
 
By mid-adolescence, at about age sixteen, most individuals have 
developed logical reasoning skills and can apply those skills to 
decision making.125 However, those skills are not refined. Renowned 
psychologist Laurence Steinberg analogized that teenage thinking 
capacity and application are similar to “starting the engines without a 
skilled driver behind the wheel.”126 With regard to identity, 
adolescents go through a phase where they emphasize “separation” 
from their parents: they experiment and try on different behaviors to 
see what best suits them.127 The Roper Court acknowledged that 
 
 123. Id. at 90 n.1; Maroney, supra note 11, at 766. 
 124. See David N. Kennedy et al., Basic Principles of MRI and Morphometry Studies of 
Human Brain Development, 5 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 268, 274 (2002) (noting linear increases in 
white matter between the ages of four and twenty and nonlinear changes in cortical gray matter); 
Maroney, supra note 13, at 95–100. 
 125. See Brief for the APA et al., Graham, supra note 3, at 14–15; Elizabeth Cauffman & 
Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less 
Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 743–45 (2000); see also Bonnie L. Halpern-
Felsher & Elizabeth Cauffman, Costs and Benefits of a Decision: Decision-Making Competence 
in Adolescents and Adults, 22 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 257, 264–71 (2001) 
(describing analyses of age differences in the consideration of multiple decision-making 
elements); Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 47, 55–59 (2008) (discussing differences between adolescent cognitive and 
psychological development). 
   126.  See Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 36 (citing Steinberg, supra note 125, 
at 54); see also Arredondo, supra note 26, at 21 (describing why restorative justice mediations are 
a “potent tool” in juvenile justice because “offenders lack . . . experience, not the capacity for 
empathy”). 
 127. See Brief for the APA et al., Graham, supra note 3, at 19–20; see, e.g., Laurence 
Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to Court, in YOUTH ON 
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adolescent identity is evolving when it said that “the character of a 
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality 
traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed,”128 and it is not until 
late adolescence or early adulthood that their values and behavior 
become relatively stable.129 
From a psychosocial perspective, taking into account emotional 
and social maturity, juveniles are more vulnerable to peer pressure, 
more emotional, more attracted to risk, and less able to resist 
impulses than fully matured adults.130 Peer pressure, stress, and 
emotions are powerful forces driving the behavior of adolescents and 
emerging adults. Peer pressure is powerful because it “can arouse 
emotions of fear, rejection, or desire to impress friends that can 
undermine the reliability of adolescent behavioral control systems 
and result in actions taken without full consideration or appreciation 
of the consequences.”131 Stress further complicates any given 
situation because it “affects the ability to effectively regulate 
behavior as well as the ability to weigh costs and benefits and 
override impulses with rational thought.”132 Stress also impacts 
 
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 27 (Thomas Grisso & Robert 
G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (“[M]ost identity development takes place during the late teens and early 
twenties.”); Alan S. Waterman, Identity Development from Adolescence to Adulthood: An 
Extension of Theory and a Review of Research, 18 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 341, 355 (1982) 
(“The most extensive advances in identity formation occur during the time spent in college.”). 
 128. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
 129. Buss, supra note 25, at 496; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 25, at 52; see also BONNIE 
ET AL., supra note 102, at 4-2 (“Research indicates that, for most youth, the period of risky 
experimentation does not extend beyond adolescence, ceasing as identity becomes settled with 
maturity. Only a small percentage of youth who engage in risky experimentation persist in their 
problem behavior into adulthood. Thus, it is not possible to predict enduring antisocial traits on 
the basis of risky behavior during adolescence.” (citations omitted)).  
 130. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70; Brief for AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 6–7; Brief 
for the APA et al., Graham, supra note 3, at 8–9; Lucy C. Ferguson, The Implications of 
Developmental Cognitive Research on “Evolving Standards of Decency” and the Imposition of 
the Death Penalty on Juveniles, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 441, 458 (2004); BONNIE ET AL., supra note 
102, at 4-2 (“Current empirical evidence from the behavioral sciences suggests that adolescents 
differ from adults and children in three important ways that lead to differences in behavior.”). 
 131. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 12; see also Laurence Steinberg & 
Kathryn C. Monahan, Age Differences in Resistance to Peer Influence, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 1531 (2007) (analyzing the resistance to peer pressure for different adolescent age 
groups and concluding that resistance declines during ages fourteen to seventeen). 
 132. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 13; see also L.P. Spear, The Adolescent 
Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 
417, 423 (2000) (arguing adolescents may perform worse in stressful situations based upon 
scientific studies). 
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hormones and hormone-driven emotional responses; therefore, 
adolescents and emerging adults experience greater volatility and 
range in their emotional responses than do mature adults.133 
In the decision-making process, while adolescents and emerging 
adults are capable of viewing and assessing both risks and rewards, 
science reveals that both of these groups weigh risks and rewards 
differently than mature adults: they tend to over-value the potential 
benefits of a risky course of action, under-appreciate the risks, and 
are less able to envision the future.134 Specifically, adolescents and 
emerging adults are less able to predict the consequences of their 
actions.135 As compared to mature adults, adolescents and emerging 
adults are less able to accurately predict the impact of their behavior, 
exercise self-restraint, and maturely weigh costs and benefits.136 One 
study reveals that adolescents at age seventeen are less able than 
adults to gauge, understand, and account for the perspectives of 
 
 133. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 13–14; see also Spear, supra note 132, 
at 429 (discussing stress triggers unique to teens and their effect on teens’ moods); Laurence 
Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental 
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009, 
1011–13 (2003) (indicating that adolescents have more rapid and more extreme mood swings 
than do adults and thus, adolescents tend to act more impulsively than adults). 
 134. Brief for the APA et al., Graham, supra note 3, at 8–9; see also Buss, supra note 25, at 
495 (stating that adolescents are psychosocially immature, which makes them lack the ability to 
control their emotions and more likely to be attracted to risky behavior); Ferguson, supra note 
130, at 458 (stating that adolescents are more “susceptib[le] to peer influence when making 
decisions and conducting cost-benefit analyses, lack realistic risk-assessment abilities, and are not 
as future-oriented as are adults”); Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk 
Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An 
Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 626–34 (2005) (discussing study 
finding that peer influence has a much greater effect on the risky behavior of adolescents and 
young adults than it does on mature adults). 
 135. Brief for the APA et al., Graham, supra note 3, at 11–12; see also Jari-Erik Nurmi, How 
Do Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the Development of Future Orientation and 
Planning, 11 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 28–29 (1991) (discussing studies that show the tendency 
to think and plan for the future increases as adolescents get older); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age 
Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28, 30, 35–36 fig.2 
(2009) (showing that those from the age of sixteen to seventeen and eighteen to twenty-one have 
lower scores in anticipation of consequences than do those from the ages of twenty-two to 
twenty-five and twenty-six to thirty). 
 136. Brief for the APA et al., Graham, supra note 3, at 8–9, 11–12; see also Elizabeth 
Cauffman et al., Age Differences in Affective Decision Making as Indexed by Performance on the 
Iowa Gambling Task, 46 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 193, 204 (2010) (discussing study showing 
that adolescents are less able to weigh choices and make better decisions). 
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others in the decision-making process.137 Adolescents and emerging 
adults are not able to reliably and consistently reflect before they 
act.138 The adolescent’s identity and psychosocial immaturity are 
interrelated: for instance, the desire to separate from one’s parents 
relates to the high value placed on one’s peers.139 Further, 
adolescents and emerging adults have little life experience that 
requires them to practice their decision-making skills.140 
In sum, adolescents and emerging adults are “less able . . . to 
self-regulate, or ‘cognitively’ control, their behavior.”141 Cognitive 
control reflects an ability to choose to act in furtherance of a goal, 
even in the presence of competing, goal-inappropriate urges.142 
Indeed, adolescents experience difficulty suppressing appealing, yet 
goal-inappropriate responses.143 This lack of impulse control results 
in decisions where reflexive responses to enticing goal-inappropriate 
 
 137. Brief for the APA et al., Graham, supra note 3, at 12; see Cauffman & Steinberg, supra 
note 125, at 746, 748, 754 tbl.4, 756 (outlining study of the physiological maturity of adults 
compared to adolescents and concluding that psychological maturity impacts decision making 
and has the greatest development from age sixteen to nineteen). 
 138. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 11; Steinberg et al., supra note 135, at 
28–29, 38–40 (stating that adolescents are less oriented to the future than are adults); see also 
Steinberg, supra note 125, at 57 (stating that “[o]ver the course of adolescence and into young 
adulthood, individuals become more future oriented”). 
 139. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 25, at 50–51. 
 140. Brief for the APA et al., Graham, supra note 3, at 11–12; see also Jeffrey Arnett, 
Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 
339, 351–53 (1992) (discussing how adolescents’ egocentrism leads them to believe they are 
excluded from situations, and referring to an earlier study by Finn and Bragg where younger 
drivers, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, estimated their likelihood of getting into 
an accident to be lower than did older drivers between the ages of thirty-eight and fifty); Nurmi, 
supra note 135, at 28–29 (discussing studies showing that “levels of planning, realization, and 
knowledge concerning the future increase with age”). 
 141. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 6; see also Beatriz Luna, The 
Maturation of Cognitive Control and the Adolescent Brain, in FROM ATTENTION TO GOAL-
DIRECTED BEHAVIOR 249, 251 (Francisco Aboitiz & Diego Cosmelli eds., 2009) (describing 
briefly cognitive control and the cognitive maturation process); Steinberg et al., supra note 135, 
at 40–41 (comparing the ability of adolescents and adults to cognitively and behaviorally self-
control); Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, Emotional and Cognitive Changes During Adolescence, 17 
CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 251, 253–54 (2007) (outlining different medical tests of 
brains showing adolescents have lesser ability to plan or reason). 
 142. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 6–7; see also Steinberg et al., supra 
note 135, at 40–41 (explaining cognitive control and discussing a study showing adolescents have 
less cognitive control and instead choose immediate rewards); Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 141, at 
253 (discussing the development of the prefrontal cortex that controls planning and reasoning 
functions). 
 143. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
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responses override a goal-directed response.144 Scholars argue that 
some level of antisocial, risky, and criminal behavior, which may 
land youth in juvenile and criminal courts, is indeed normative 
adolescent behavior.145 
C.  Neuroscience: Structural and Functional Brain Development 
 
Advances in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technology 
have greatly added to the body of knowledge about the growth and 
capabilities of the human brain.146 These studies reveal data about 
brain development, which corroborate and further inform findings in 
the field of psychological development. For both age groups—
adolescents and emerging adults—the structure of the brain and the 
way in which it functions are not fully developed compared to the 
 
 144. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 10; B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent 
Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 62, 64 (2008); see also Luna, supra note 141, at 251 
(describing briefly cognitive control and the cognitive maturation process). 
 145. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 6; see also Brief for the APA et al., 
Graham, supra note 3, at 11 (discussing a study showing adolescents weigh risks and rewards 
differently than adults and therefore are more likely to engage in risky behavior); Arnett, supra 
note 140, at 343–44 (stating that reckless behavior is a normative part of adolescent actions); 
Casey et al., supra note 144, at 65 (discussing the increased risk taking and impulsive behavior 
among young adolescents due to underdeveloped parts of the brain); Spear, supra note 132, at 
421–23 (arguing adolescents are greater risk takers and discussing studies supporting the theory). 
 146. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 14–15; see also Florence Antoine, 
Cooperative Group Evaluating Diagnostic Imaging Techniques, 81 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1347, 
1348 (1989) (“MRI measures the response of atoms in different tissues when they are pulsed with 
radio waves that are under the influence of magnetic fields thousands of times the strength of the 
earth’s. Each type of tissue responds differently, emitting characteristic signals from the nuclei of 
its cells. The signals are fed into a computer, the position of those atoms is recorded, and a 
composite picture of the body area being examined is generated and studied in depth.”); David 
Dobbs, Teenage Brains, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 2011, available at 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2011/10/teenage-brains/dobbs-text (“[R]esearchers developed 
brain-imaging technology that enabled them to see the teen brain in enough detail to track both its 
physical development and its patterns of activity.”); Sarah Durston et al., Anatomical MRI of the 
Developing Human Brain: What Have We Learned?, 40 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRY 1012, 1012 (2001) (giving an overview of MRI studies of brain development in 
childhood and adolescence); Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 141, at 251–52 (“[S]tructural MRI and 
functional MRI (fMRI) . . . have become important modalities for research on brain development 
as they have been able to provide a more detailed picture of how the brain changes. The 
application of these methods to the study of children and adolescents provides an extraordinary 
opportunity to advance our understanding of the neurobiological changes and functional abilities 
associated with brain maturation.”); Claudia Wallis, What Makes Teens Tick, TIME,  
Sept. 26, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,994126,00.html. 
(“MRI studies have cracked open a window on the developing brain.”). 
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brain of a mature adults.147 Indeed, human brains are still maturing 
and not fully developed until the mid-twenties.148 The particular area 
of the brain that is the last to mature is the prefrontal cortex, which 
controls what are called executive functions—“response inhibition, 
emotional regulation, planning and organization.”149 Significantly, 
the prefrontal cortex is responsible for impulse control, risk 
assessment, evaluation of reward and punishment, voluntary 
behavior control (i.e., choosing a goal-directed response), judgment 
of future consequences, responses to criticism and affirmation (i.e., 
 
 147. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 6; see BONNIE ET AL., supra note 102, 
at 4–6 (“[W]hat distinguishes adolescents from children and adults is an imbalance among 
developing brain systems.”); Cauffman et al., supra note 136, at 206; Jason Chein et al., Peers 
Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing Activity in the Brain’s Reward Circuitry, 14 
DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F1, F1–F2 (2011); Fulton Crews et al., Adolescent Cortical Development: 
A Critical Period of Vulnerability for Addiction, 86 PHARMACOLOGY BIOCHEMISTRY AND 
BEHAV. 189, 190 (2007); see also Durston et al., supra note 146, at 1012 (reviewing results of 
MRI studies of brain development in childhood and adolescence); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age 
Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report: 
Evidence for a Dual System Model, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764, 1776 (2008) (linking 
lack of impulse control to sensation-seeking behaviors and noting that sensation seeking 
behaviors and lack of impulse control is greatest from age ten to fifteen). See generally Nitin 
Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through 
Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8174, 8177 (2004) (discussing the development 
process of the brain and its correlation to milestones in cognitive and functional development of 
adolescents). 
 148. Maroney, supra note 13, at 152. 
 149. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 17, 19; see Casey et al., supra note 144, 
at 68; Eveline A. Crone et al., Neurocognitive Development of Relational Reasoning, 12 
DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 55, 56 (2009) (“Neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies have 
shown that prefrontal cortex (PFC) is strongly implicated in relational reasoning.”); Elizabeth R. 
Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and Striatal 
Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860 (1999); see also MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET AL., 
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND 75 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the 
function of the frontal lobe of the brain); B.J. Casey et al., Structural and Functional Brain 
Development and Its Relation to Cognitive Development, 54 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 241, 243 
(2000) (describing the maturation process of the brain and concluding that the prefrontal cortex is 
one of the last areas to develop); Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and 
Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861 (1999) (discussing study 
of the stages of development of the adolescent brain); Isabelle M. Rosso et al., Cognitive and 
Emotional Components of Frontal Lobe Functioning in Childhood and Adolescence, 1021 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 355, 360–61 (2004) (comparing the correlation between frontal lobe 
development in adolescents and response inhibition and social anxiety levels). See generally 
Silvia A. Bunge et al., Immature Frontal Lobe Contributions to Cognitive Control in Children: 
Evidence from fMRI, 33 NEURON 301 (2002) (arguing that studies of adolescent and adult brains 
show adolescents have lesser ability to resist risk taking because areas of their brains are 
underdeveloped). 
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susceptibility to peer pressure), and moral reasoning.150 This is a very 
scientific way of saying that adolescents and emerging adults tend to 
act more impulsively than adults because of the stage of their 
development. 
While the brain’s prefrontal cortex and its connections to the rest 
of the brain are slow to develop, adolescents and emerging adults 
experience greater relative development in their motivational 
system.151 The motivational system, which incentivizes “risky and 
reward-seeking behavior,” develops earlier than the cognitive 
prefrontal cortex, which functions to counteract the impulsivity of 
the motivational system.152 Prior to the full development of the 
prefrontal cortex, adolescents and emerging adults primarily rely 
upon the amygdala, which is known for emotional impulsivity and 
violent behavior.153 The amygdala is a neural system that perceives 
 
 150. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 17–19; see also GAZZANIGA ET AL., 
supra note 149, at 75 (describing the function of the frontal lobe of the brain); Antoine Bechara et 
al., Characterization of the Decision-Making Deficit of Patients with Ventromedial Prefrontal 
Cortex Lesions, 123 BRAIN 2189, 2198–99 (2000) (describing a study of those with prefrontal 
cortex damage and concluding it has led to those patients having difficulty comprehending the 
consequences of their actions); Casey et al., supra note 149, at 244 (describing tasks normally 
associated with prefrontal cortex); Crone et al., supra note 149, at 56 (stating that 
“[n]europsychological and neuroimaging studies have shown that prefrontal cortex (PFC) is 
strongly implicated in relational reasoning”); Jorge Moll et al., Frontopolar and Anterior 
Temporal Cortex Activation in a Moral Judgment Task: Preliminary Functional MRI Results in 
Normal Subjects, 59 ARQ NEUROPSIQUIATR 657 (2001) (discussing a study showing that moral 
judgments are made using the frontopolar cortex of the brain); John O’Doherty et al., Abstract 
Reward and Punishment Representations in the Human Orbitofrontal Cortex, 4 NATURE 
NEUROSCIENCE 95 (2001) (explaining research showing emotional responses are guided by the 
orbitofrontal cortex of the brain); Robert D. Rogers et al., Choosing Between Small, Likely 
Rewards and Large, Unlikely Rewards Activates Inferior and Orbital Prefrontal Cortex, 20 J. 
NEUROSCIENCE 9029, 9029 (1999) (concluding that studies show the orbital prefrontal cortex is 
linked to decision making and risk-reward comprehension); Rosso, supra note 149, at 360–61 
(comparing the correlation between frontal lobe development in adolescents and response 
inhibition and social anxiety levels); Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 141, at 253 (discussing the 
development of the prefrontal cortex that controls planning and reasoning functions). See 
generally Bunge et al., supra note 149 (arguing that studies of adolescent and adult brains show 
adolescents have lesser ability to resist risk taking because areas of their brains are 
underdeveloped). 
 151. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 29–30. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. at 30; see also GAZZANIGA ET AL., supra note 149, at 553–73 (describing the 
amygdala and its connection to learned emotional responses); ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE 
EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES & THE CIVILIZED MIND 31 (2001) (describing the function 
of the amygdala); Ralph Adolphs, Neural Systems for Recognizing Emotion, 12 CURRENT 
OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 169 (2002) (discussing the neural structures necessary for perceiving 
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danger and processes emotional responses to that danger in a rapid, 
automatic fashion.154 This reliance on the amygdala, together with 
the relative dominance of the motivational system overall, impacts 
and correlates with the difficulty experienced by adolescents and 
emerging adults in overcoming impulses and predicting the long-
term consequences of their actions.155 It also explains why they do 
not engage in mature cost-benefit analyses.156 
Until the early to mid-twenties, the human brain undergoes two 
processes that directly impact cognitive control of behavior.157 First, 
there is the process of myelination, which involves the coating of the 
neural fibers in the brain (called axons) with a white fatty substance 
(called myelin) that facilitates communication between various parts 
of the brain, making the transmission of information faster and more 
reliable.158 Second, the brain is undergoing “synaptic pruning,” 
 
emotions); Hans C. Breiter et al., Response and Habituation of the Human Amygdala During 
Visual Processing of Facial Expression, 17 NEURON 875 (1996) (discussing research showing the 
amygdala is related to emotional responses to facial expressions); Richard D. Lane et al., 
Neuroanatomical Correlates of Pleasant and Unpleasant Emotion, 35 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 
1437, 1441 (1997) (discussing findings that the amygdala was stimulated during unpleasant 
emotions); K. Luan Phan et al., Functional Neuroanatomy of Emotion: A Meta-Analysis of 
Emotion Activation Studies in PET and fMRI, 16 NEUROIMAGE 331, 336 (2002) (stating that fear 
is connected to the amygdala); Steinberg et al., supra note 135, at 40 (discussing young 
adolescents’ impulsivity and disposition for instant gratification). See generally Jan Gläscher & 
Ralph Adolphs, Processing of the Arousal of Subliminal and Supraliminal Emotional Stimuli by 
the Human Amygdala, 23 J. NEUROSCIENCE 10274 (2003) (reporting the results of a study on 
amygdala damage and its effect on emotions). 
 154. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 31; see GOLDBERG, supra note 153, at 
31 (describing briefly the function of the amygdala as a “fight or flight” reactor); Jay N. Giedd, 
The Teen Brain: Insights from Neuroimaging, 42 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 335, 338 (2008) 
(stating that the amygdala is essential to survival impulses); see also William D.S. Killgore & 
Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Activation of the Amygdala and Anterior Cingulate During 
Nonconscious Processing of Sad Versus Happy Faces, 21 NEUROIMAGE 1215 (2004) (reporting 
on a study on the effect of sad and happy facial expressions on the amygdala); Phan et al., supra 
note 153, at 336 (analyzing the relationship between the emotion of fear and the function of the 
amygdala). 
 155. See Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkins for 
Executing and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463, 515 (2003). 
 156. See id. 
 157. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 20; Brief for the APA et al., Graham, 
supra note 3, at 25. 
 158. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 23–24; Brief for the APA et al., 
Graham, supra note 3, at 25–27; Feld, supra note 155, at 517; see also GOLDBERG, supra note 
153, at 144 (describing the development of the brain including myelinization in the context of 
society’s development); Zoltan Nagy et al., Maturation of White Matter Is Associated with the 
Development of Cognitive Functions During Childhood, 16 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1227, 
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which involves a reduction in the amount of gray matter in the 
brain.159 Pruning is the process of eliminating unused and 
burdensome neural connections so that the brain can function more 
efficiently.160 Pruning permits the reasoning areas of the brain, for 
example, the frontal lobe, to develop and fully function.161 The 
presence of gray matter and the process of pruning are not linear,162 
as gray matter is pruned during one phase beginning at infancy and 
again later in childhood, reaching its peak from ages ten to twenty.163 
The prefrontal cortex is the last region of the brain to be pruned for 
peak performance, which means that a person’s ability to process 
complex information related to risk assessment, impulse control, 
decision-making, planning, and emotional regulation is not fully 
mature until he or she reaches his or her mid-twenties.164 Until 
myelination and pruning are complete, adolescents and emerging 
adults control their behavior by relying upon the amygdala, which is 
known for emotional impulsivity, rather than the prefrontal cortex, 
 
1231–32 (2004) (stating that “the physiological effects of increases in axon thickness and 
myelination are similar in that they both increase conduction speed,” which could “improve 
functionality by providing faster information transfer, and allowing a more precise timing in the 
communication between cortical areas”). 
 159. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 21; see also Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., 
Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: 
Inverse Relationships During Postadolescent Brain Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819, 8826 
(2001) (describing their study’s findings that grey matter reduction leads to more brain growth in 
adolescence). 
 160. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 21; see Giedd, supra note 154, at 337; 
Gogtay et al., supra note 147, at 8174; Sowell et al., supra note 159, at 8828. 
 161. See Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 21–22; Brief for the APA et al., 
Graham, supra note 3, at 26; Gogtay et al., supra note 147, at 8174 (noting in a ten-year study of 
gray matter loss, results showed continuous gray matter loss until adulthood). 
 162. Gogtay et al., supra note 147, at 8174. 
 163. Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 22–23; see Durston et al., supra note 
146, at 1014; see also Giedd, supra note 154, at 339 (discussing age-related changes in the brain); 
Giedd et al., supra note 149, at 861–62 (noting the linear increase of white matter with the 
increase in age); Kennedy et al., supra note 124, at 274 (“[Studies] demonstrate[d] nonlinear 
changes in cortical gray matter, summarized as a preadolescent increase followed by a 
postadolescent decrease. Further localization of these changes indicated that the frontal and 
parietal lobe peaked at about age 12, the temporal lobe at about age 16, and the occipital lobe 
continued its increase through age 20, although the confidence intervals on these observations are 
large.”); Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 141, at 252 (describing the development of the brain from 
decreasing gray matter to linear increasing white matter with age). 
 164. See Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 22–23; Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 
141, at 253. 
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which is responsible for impulse control, risk assessment, and moral 
reasoning.165 
Thus, there are physiological and biological reasons explaining 
why youthful offenders, like Ben, make risky decisions. Youthful 
offenders have an organic impairment that impacts their ability to 
plan, organize their thoughts, and make rational decisions.166 They 
respond instinctively in stressful situations and act upon gut reactions 
rather than making conscious, thought-out decisions.167 Because of 
this, the sentencing process for adolescents and young adults should 
take into consideration the unique developmental features of an 
adolescent or young adult’s thought process and behavior. 
 
D.  Line-Drawing and the Supreme Court’s Recognition of Scientific 
Findings of Youthful Offenders’ Immaturity 
 
Panic about juvenile crime reached its height in the 1980s and 
1990s,168 and states increasingly decided to transfer juveniles 
accused of crimes committed before the age of eighteen to adult 
court.169 When it comes to criminality, both adolescents and 
emerging adults do not function the way that fully mature adults do, 
and they should not receive consequences that are the same as those 
given to fully mature adults. Scholar Emily Buss asserts that 
legislative policy that changes the way that juvenile crime is treated 
reflects a developmental message: “In the eyes of the law, criminal 
conduct turned minors into adults.”170 
This Article proposes that legislators should be urged to view 
the complexities of development and brain maturation together, 
while at the same time crafting developmentally appropriate 
 
 165. See Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 25, 30–32. 
 166. See Brief for the APA et al., Graham, supra note 3, at 27. 
 167. See Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, supra note 3, at 31–32. 
 168. Buss, supra note 13, at 33 (evidencing the prevalence of the super-predator image); 
Henning, supra note 9, at 1113. 
 169. Henning, supra note 9, at 1113; Matthew Kauffman, A Troubled System for Troubling 
Children: Lawmakers Aim to Fix Juvenile Justice System, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 23, 1995, 
http://articles.courant.com/1995-04-23/news/9504230117_1_juvenile-justice-system-young-
offenders-troubled-children. 
 170. Buss, supra note 13, at 33 (“The public enthusiasm for this get-tough trend was captured 
in the refrain ‘adult time for adult crime.’” (citations omitted)). 
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sentencing practices, be they for juvenile or adult court proceedings. 
Scholars, child development researchers, and even the Court have 
acknowledged that the age of eighteen is the line that has been 
chosen and held as a compromise of practical necessity.171 And, 
indeed, some state law recognizes that emerging adults are distinct 
from mature adults by treating certain emerging adults more 
leniently.172 
While lawmakers have yet to integrate the science of 
development and maturation with developmentally appropriate 
sentencing procedures, in Roper, Graham, and Miller, the U.S. 
Supreme Court applied scientific findings to limit the imposition of 
the harshest sentences on offenders whose offenses were committed 
as juveniles (under eighteen)—specifically capital punishment and 
life without the possibility of parole. In each of the aforementioned 
cases, juvenile offenders were removed from the juvenile system and 
treated as adults in the criminal justice system. 
In 2005, the Supreme Court recognized advances in science 
when it outlawed the imposition of the death penalty for juveniles in 
Roper.173 The Roper Court frequently cited recent scientific 
developments in the understanding of psychosocial and brain 
development of adolescents.174 The Court described three general 
 
 171. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (“The qualities that distinguish 
juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some 
under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach . . . . [H]owever, a 
line must be drawn . . . . The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many 
purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death 
eligibility ought to rest.”) construed in Buss, supra note 13, at 40 (stating that “at this point in the 
opinion, the Court retreats to conventional language about the inaccuracy, but practical necessity, 
of bright line rules”). 
 172. See, e.g., Youth Rehabilitation Act, D.C. CODE §§ 24-901–24-907 (2001) (aiming to 
separate youthful adult offenders from more experienced adult offenders by giving the qualified 
youthful offender an opportunity to receive a more favorable treatment; per section (f) of the 
Act’s regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 2.106(f) (2012), the youthful parolee may even receive 
unconditional discharge from supervision based on a number of factors, including prior criminal 
history, seriousness of offense, and stability of residence and family); Wells v. Golden, 785 A.2d 
641, 646 (D.C. 2001) (“In the context of the YRA’s emphasis on treatment and rehabilitation, the 
‘appropriateness’ of release under D.C. Code § 24-904(a) must depend, at least in part, on a 
consideration of such factors. The Board of Parole is therefore obliged to make its parole 
decisions in light of the youthful offender’s potential or actual progress, or lack thereof, in his 
program of treatment.” (emphasis added)). 
 173. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–71. 
 174. Id. 
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differences between juveniles under eighteen and adults, all of which 
are relevant beyond the context of the death penalty: (1) children 
lack maturity, do not feel the same sense of responsibility, and, thus, 
often act impetuously and without careful consideration for the 
consequences of their actions;175 (2) children are “more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including 
peer pressure,” and are also “susceptible to influence and to 
psychological damage;”176 and (3) a child’s character “is not as well 
formed as that of an adult”177 because their “personality traits . . . are 
more transitory, less fixed.”178 The Court did acknowledge, however, 
that it is impossible to determine which juveniles will outgrow their 
offending behavior.179 
The Supreme Court expanded its recognition of the uniqueness 
of youthful development in its decisions in Graham and Miller. In 
Graham and Miller, the Court extended the rationale for differential 
treatment of juveniles at sentencing beyond the context of the death 
penalty and applied its rationale to limit sentences of JLWOP. In 
Graham, the Court outlawed the imposition of a life sentence 
without the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of 
 
 175. Id. at 569. 
 176. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court went on to explain that this has a 
particular impact on children who may find themselves trapped in a toxic environment: 
“[J]uveniles have less control, or less experience with control, over their own environment.” Id. 
“‘[A]s legal minors, [juveniles] lack the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a 
criminogenic setting[.]’” Id. (quoting Steinberg & Scott, supra note 133, at 1014). “Their own 
vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles 
have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their 
whole environment.” Id. at 570. Adults are supposed to avoid negative influences, while children, 
who are biologically susceptible to negative influences, cannot choose to get away from those 
influences; therefore, children are more likely to make bad choices because of their environments. 
Id. at 569–70. 
 177. Id. at 570. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 573.  
It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. As we understand it, this 
difficulty underlies the rule forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing any patient under 
18 as having antisocial personality disorder, a disorder also referred to as psychopathy 
or sociopathy, and which is characterized by callousness, cynicism, and contempt for 
the feelings, rights, and suffering of others. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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nonhomicide offenses.180 Following a guilty plea, Graham was 
convicted of robbery at age sixteen.181 He was tried in a Florida 
criminal court and ultimately sentenced as an adult.182 After serving 
a year in prison, Graham was released and then re-arrested for 
burglary at age seventeen.183 When Graham’s probation for his 
previous robbery conviction was revoked, he faced a suspended 
sentence.184 The trial court judge chose to sentence Graham for the 
robbery to the draconian maximum penalty of JLWOP.185 The Court 
then held that sentencing a juvenile offender to LWOP is 
unconstitutional for a crime not involving homicide.186 
In Miller, the Court combined the two cases of Evan Miller and 
Kuntrell Jackson, both fourteen at the time they committed their 
offenses.187 Both juveniles were charged with murder,188 though 
Kuntrell Jackson was charged with felony murder.189 Both juveniles 
were charged in adult criminal court, and both received sentences of 
LWOP.190 The Miller Court held that juveniles sentenced to LWOP 
must have some “meaningful opportunity” for review of their 
sentences.191 
In between Graham and Miller, the Court decided J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina.192 In J.D.B., the Court held that courts must take age 
into account when determining the custody prong of Miranda.193 
J.D.B. was thirteen years old when he was taken to the principal’s 
office and interrogated.194 No one read J.D.B. his Miranda warnings, 
and thus, he did not have an opportunity to waive his rights.195 Prior 
 
 180. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
 181. Id. at 2018. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 2018–19. 
 184. Id. at 2019. 
 185. Id. at 2020. 
 186. Id. at 2034. 
 187. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460–62 (2012). 
 188. Id. at 2460. 
 189. Id. at 2461. 
 190. Id. at 2461, 2463. 
 191. Id. at 2469. What exactly “meaningful opportunity” would look like and when it must 
occur was left undefined by the Court in Miller. 
 192. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
 193. Id. at 2402–03. 
 194. Id. at 2399. 
 195. Id. 
REDUCING INCARCERATION 9/6/2014  11:46 AM 
846 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:801 
 
to J.D.B., custody was evaluated using an objective standard that was 
applied to adults in the same way that it was applied to children.196 
To determine whether a suspect was in custody was determined by 
resolving whether a reasonable person would feel that she or he was 
not free to go and that his or her freedom was restrained in such a 
manner that was consistent with a formal arrest.197 The J.D.B. Court 
said that what may not feel like custody to an adult may, in fact, feel 
like custody to a child; therefore, the age of a child suspect must be 
taken into account when determining whether a reasonable person in 
that child’s position would have felt like she or he was in custody.198 
The rationale for the Court’s decision rested not on science, but 
instead on common sense: kids are kids, and kids are different than 
adults.199 
In all four of these cases—Roper, Graham, Miller, and J.D.B.—
the Court held that offenders under the age of eighteen had a right to 
be treated differently than adults. The Court re-affirmed in each case 
that adolescents are biologically immature, making them 
categorically less culpable, more vulnerable and susceptible to 
influence, and necessarily imbued with the potential to outgrow 
abhorrent behavior. The Court relied heavily on science that applied 
to both adolescents and emerging adults. Taken all together, these 
holdings announced the principle that the relative immaturity of 
juveniles is a basis to treat them differently than adults, not only at 
sentencing but also at other stages of criminal procedure.200 
 
 196. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 197. Id. at 444. 
 198. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402–03. 
 199. Id. at 2403. 
 200. Recognizing the rehabilitative purpose of juvenile courts, some scholars have argued that 
due process concerns demand a different approach to the sentencing of young people. For an 
example of the codification of rehabilitative purpose, see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 
(Deering 2006). For a discussion of a juvenile due process right, see Neelum Arya, Using Graham 
v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99, 103 (2010) (arguing that 
Graham should be interpreted to afford juveniles a right to rehabilitation); see also Martin 
Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate Sentencing, 47 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, at 492, 499 (stating that juveniles have a due process right to 
differential treatment by the justice system, and in particular, they have a due process right to 
individualized and age-appropriate sentencing); Henning, supra note 9, at 1119 & n.57 (stating 
that states have made a commitment to rehabilitation through state statutes, including in D.C., 
which is held accountable by statute to rehabilitate juveniles). 
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E.  Penological Justifications Apply with Lesser or No Force to 
Youthful Offenders 
To measure the efficacy of incarceration as a punishment, one 
must assess whether any of the five overarching justifications for 
punishment are furthered by its use.201 The five justifications are (1) 
rehabilitation; (2) deterrence (both general deterrence to the wider 
community and specific deterrence to that particular offender); (3) 
incapacitation; (4) retribution; and (5) restitution.202 The first four 
justifications are the typically invoked penological justifications.203 
First, simply, rehabilitation is furthered by access to programs 
and education in the community.204 Significantly, while it is not the 
only goal of juvenile delinquency court, rehabilitation is an over-
arching purpose of juvenile courts205 because youth are more 
amenable to rehabilitation, as they do not yet have fully formed 
personalities and are therefore inherently malleable.206 Youth are 
open to positive as well as negative influences; role models, 
socialization, and education will help to shape offenders, positively 
or negatively, into the person they will grow to become.207 Simply 
put, a youthful offender who comes of age behind bars has not been 
socialized, prepared, educated, equipped, and nurtured to become a 
productive, law-abiding citizen. This is not a recipe for success, and 
restorative justice programs in the community show more promise at 
achieving rehabilitative goals and reducing recidivism.208 
 
 201. E.g., Timothy Cone, Double Jeopardy, Post-Blakely, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1373, 1381 
(2004). 
 202. E.g., id. 
 203. See Johnson & Miller, supra note 29, at 102. 
 204. Community programs work better than incarceration, and data on the rehabilitative 
impact of restorative justice programs is promising. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 117. 
Rehabilitation could be promoted by (1) reducing incarceration; (2) dealing with community 
programs; and (3) using restorative justice programs in the community. See BONNIE ET AL., supra 
note 102, at 6-5 (“[R]isk of reoffending . . .  might be lowered by particular interventions, 
monitoring in the community, or changes in life situation.”). 
 205. See Henning, supra note 9, at 1119 (emphasizing rehabilitation as an overarching goal of 
juvenile courts). 
 206. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 25, at 53; Steinberg & Scott, supra note 133, at 
1016. 
 207. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 25, at 56–57. 
 208. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 117 & n.153. 
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Second, deterrence does not justify youth incarceration. As a 
group, youthful offenders do not think through the consequences of 
their actions before they act209 because they act impulsively and 
cannot recognize consequences and weigh those consequences 
before acting.210 Thus, whether examining specific or general 
deterrence of youthful offenders, the offenders are not likely to be 
deterred because, even if they knew about the potential prison 
sentence that they might face, they are unlikely to factor it into a 
decision.211 Further, in my experience, the young clients I 
represented were dumfounded by the mandatory minimums they 
faced. In order to deter or argue with any legitimacy that deterrence 
has any force, the United States would have to air commercials on 
mandatory minimums during cartoons. 
Third, the Court has recognized that incapacitation does not 
justify incarceration for all juvenile offenders.212 Incapacitation is 
limited in that it may justify punishment for juveniles only in 
instances where the juvenile is determined to be a threat to society. 
The Court has cautioned that predicting future dangerousness of 
juveniles must be tempered by the understanding that the qualities of 
youth are temporary.213 In explaining why JLWOP cannot be 
justified on the basis of incapacitation, the Court elaborated: 
“Deciding that a ‘juvenile offender forever will be a danger to 
society’ would require ‘mak[ing] a judgment that [he] is 
incorrigible’—but ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.’”214 
The fourth penological justification is retribution—the 
proposition that an “offender should be punished ‘because and only 
 
 209. Steinberg & Scott, supra note 133, at 1016–17. 
 210. Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12–15, 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); see Brief for the Am. Bar Ass’n as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-
9646 and 10-9647); Brief for the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11–
13, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412 and 08-7621) (supporting the idea 
that deterrence would not be served by punishing juveniles so harshly); see also Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2565 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2016 (2010); Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005) (all adopting this rationale as one of the bases for the 
Court’s decision). 
 211. See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 133, at 1012. Lack of knowledge of the sentence they 
would face is an issue for adults as well as youth. 
 212. See Miller, 132 S. Ct at 2465. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029). 
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because, [he] deserves it.’”215 Retribution embraces the notion of 
society needing to get even with an offender for the harm she or he 
inflicted. Society is less justified in “the sense of rage and moral 
indignity” it feels for youthful offenders.216 When it comes to 
retribution, the Roper, Graham, and Miller Courts have recognized 
that children have a reduced culpability making it less justifiable to 
impose the harshest of punishments on them.217 Writing for the 
Miller Court, Justice Kagan explained that “[b]ecause [t]he heart of 
the retribution rationale relates to an offender’s blameworthiness, the 
case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.”218 
Finally, the fifth rationale used to justify incarceration is 
restitution.219 An inmate’s ability to make financial restitution, or to 
pay back a victim in order to compensate for losses suffered, is not 
furthered by access to jail jobs with jail pay because the pay is 
extremely minimal.220 Instead, chances of making financial 
restitution are furthered by a community-based sentence where an 
offender has access to minimum pay jobs at the very least.221 
 
 215. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 107 & n.86 (quoting Michael S. Moore and 
referencing Immanuel Kant). “[T]he appropriate amount of punishment is commensurate with the 
objective moral seriousness of the offense.” Id. at 107. “[C]haracter retributivism” stands for the 
proposition that an offender should be punished not just because of his bad conduct, but also for 
his bad character. Id. (citation omitted). 
 216. Johnson & Miller, supra note 29, at 117 (discussing this as related strictly to juveniles 
and JLWOP). 
 217. To deserve punishment, an offender must be culpable. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; 
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2016; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).  
 218. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, one scholar has 
proposed that in fact, retribution is more accurately captured by a distributive theory of 
punishment––that victims and society seek retribution as a part of the criminal justice system to 
distribute pain and suffering equally. The offender has inflicted pain and suffering on a victim, 
and now the court system and the victim can inflict pain and suffering back onto the offender. 
Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) 
(describing a distributive theory of punishment where harm, pain, and suffering is transferred 
from crime victims to offenders). 
 219. Restitution was neither addressed by the Court in Roper, Graham, or Miller, nor in the 
briefs, because it is generally not considered a penological justification. 
 220. LEVIN, supra note 94, at 1 (“In 2008, Texas prison inmates paid a mere $501,000 in total 
victim restitution, fines, fees and court costs, an average of only $3.21 per inmate. Parolees did 
better, paying $1.2 million solely in victim restitution, an average of $15.18 per parolee. Parolees 
typically have a lower educational level and income than probationers and face many challenges 
in readjusting to society.” (footnote omitted)). 
 221. While offenders will have greater access to paying jobs in the community, their access 
will still be limited by their arrest record, and it will be impacted further by a conviction, 
especially if they have suffered a felony conviction. Pager, supra note 88, at 960–62. 
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F.  Limitations of Developmental Science 
There are several valid criticisms of and caveats to the use of 
developmental science. Fundamentally, the science provides general 
information about how most individuals develop. There are, of 
course, going to be individual differences in development and 
maturity. General conclusions cannot provide precise differentiation 
for each individual.222 It is not practical for each individual to have a 
brain scan and battery of psychological tests to determine at 
sentencing just how “mature” and “culpable” that individual is in 
order to dole out a punishment that is precisely tailored to that 
individual’s stage of development and future potential.223 Further, 
each individual has been impacted by environmental factors that will 
vary from neighborhood to neighborhood and family to family. Some 
offenders may have brains and psychosocial development that lag 
even further behind norms for peers in the same age group, 
especially when they have been subject to trauma, abuse, or 
neglect.224 Moreover, individuals who suffer from mental illness or a 
learning disability may function at levels that are less mature than 
what their brain scans alone may present. Drug exposure in utero or 
substance use during childhood and adolescence could further hinder 
 
 222. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (discussing drawing the line at eighteen years of age); Buss, 
supra note 13, at 39–40; Maroney, supra note 13, at 94. 
 223. While not every defendant may have the opportunity to undergo such tests, the tests have 
been found helpful in determining culpability. Benedict Carey, Study of Judges Finds Evidence 
from Brain Scans Led to Lighter Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2012, at A12.  
 224. Henry R. Cellini, Child Abuse, Neglect, and Delinquency: The Neurological Link, 55 
JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 7 (2004) (providing data indicating that children are more susceptible to 
influence and psychological damage). Chronic stress and repeated traumas can cause someone to 
over-use fear as an instinctual survival response. Id. “Attention, impulse control, quality of sleep, 
and fine motor control can all be impacted by chronic activation of the centers of the brain that 
deal with the fear response . . . .” Id. Trauma experienced early in life can also interfere with 
subcortical and limbic system development, leading to anxiety, depression, and reaction 
attachment disorders. Id. at 9–10. “Not only can hyper-aroused children react anxiously or 
aggressively to non-verbal cues that their memory says are threats, they may actually provoke 
threatening behavior from others so that they have some control over what happens next: A bully 
in middle school or high school fits this profile.” Id. at 7 (citation omitted). For those cases that 
may be mitigated by aspects of self-defense or when offenders themselves have suffered from 
PTSD, studies show that trauma causes actual scarring on the brain that we can see. Id. at 9–10. 
Offenders who have suffered abuse are more likely to develop depression and PTSD. Id. at 10; 
see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (discussing three general differences between juveniles under 
eighteen and adults that affect culpability). 
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“normal” development. There are also findings that some groups 
mature more quickly than others. For example, when examined by 
gender, as a general matter, girls mature more quickly than boys.225 
In light of these limitations, some scholars caution that actors in 
the criminal justice system must apply the science carefully.226 The 
science has implications for not only adolescents in juvenile court 
but also for emerging adults in adult criminal courts. To be faithful to 
the scientific findings and consistent, criminal justice actors must 
apply the findings to both groups.227 My Proposal is informed by 
general truisms for the population of youthful offenders as a whole. 
Differences in the functioning of individuals do not mean that 
policies should abandon knowledge gleaned from advances in 
developmental science. Any perceived dangers of applying general 
findings in developmental science are outweighed by the anticipated 
benefits of a developmentally informed sentence for youthful 
offenders. 
IV.  THE PROMISE OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTALLY 
APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO THE SENTENCING OF YOUTHFUL 
OFFENDERS 
 
Our ever expanding knowledge about youthful thinking and 
behavior logically requires a new, developmentally based approach 
to the sentencing of youthful offenders. The focus such sentencing 
should be how a court can help the offender grow into a thoughtful, 
mature, and law-abiding adult. Adolescents and emerging adults 
think and behave differently from mature adults, and the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that those differences must be considered at 
the sentencing phase for juveniles.228 Science informs that a 
community-based alternative to incarceration is a developmentally 
appropriate sentence for young offenders, even when those offenders 
are accused of crimes classified as serious and violent. 
 
 225. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 125, at 753. 
 226. Buss, supra note 13, at 14. 
 227. See id. at 42. 
 228. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464–69 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011, 2026 (2010); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
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This Article asserts that adolescents and emerging adults should 
receive age appropriate sentences because of their biological 
immaturity. As Justice Sotomayer said in J.D.B., and as Justice 
Kagan referenced in Miller, “‘Our history is replete with laws and 
judicial recognition’ that children cannot be viewed simply as 
miniature adults.”229 The restorative justice model is a step in the 
right direction towards fostering developmentally appropriate 
sentencing for youthful offenders. 
A.  Age-Appropriate Sentencing 
“[A] sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an 
adult.”230 
 
Historically, juvenile delinquency courts were created with the 
mission and purpose of helping children become “productive, law-
abiding” citizens.231 There has always been a special 
acknowledgement that children as a group are “open to positive 
influence” and are “amenable to change.”232 Our judicial system 
should communicate developmentally appropriate messages to 
children with the developmentally targeted goal of shaping children 
into the type of responsible adults that society wants them to 
become.233  
 
 229. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470 (quoting J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 
(2011)). 
 230. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 
 231. Buss, supra note 13, at 21. 
 232. Id. Long before Roper, laws created by society and by the courts have taken child 
development—capabilities, vulnerabilities, and potential—into consideration in the assigning of 
children’s rights, culpability, and responsibilities. See generally id. at 21–22 (discussing the 
importance of the consideration of children’s capacities in determining their rights and 
responsibilities). Now, social science and neuroscience data offer a more nuanced understanding 
of developmental capacities at various ages—an understanding that can be connected to relevant 
legal contexts of youthful decision making. Id. at 31 n.88.  
    233.   For this group of children, their experience with the court system may be one of the few 
opportunities that they have to participate in a deliberative process alongside adults in positions of 
authority, and that participation will help them to shape their sense of self in relation to the 
community and government. Id. at 63. For this cohort, their experiences with law enforcement 
and the court system will impact their sense of the fairness and legitimacy of government and the 
rule of law. Id. Thus, fair treatment by law enforcement and engagement in the process will 
impact their respect for laws, government, and the political process. See id. at 64. Further, this 
may have greater implications for children when issues of race are taken into account. For 
instance, do children in disproportionately poor and minority neighborhoods have less respect for 
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Science should impact the courts’ treatment of juvenile 
offenders by focusing on what the justice process—especially the 
designing of age-appropriate consequences and treatment 
opportunities—can do for juvenile development.234 Courts can 
communicate clearly that certain behavior is wrong while addressing 
the offending behavior with consequences other than 
incarceration.235 Just because behavior is deemed wrong, and an 
offender culpable, it does not follow that incarceration should be the 
automatic response. The courts can simultaneously condemn 
unlawful conduct and respond with developmentally sound sentences 
that offer learning opportunities for all youthful offenders.236 
Age-appropriate sentences for youthful offenders should provide 
opportunities for those offenders to understand the consequences of 
their behavior and to hone prosocial thinking habits. Such sentences 
would recognize that youthful offenders have growth potential in 
response to environmental change,237 that incarceration has a 
negative impact on development of youthful offenders,238 and that 
 
the law because they feel singled out in the attention of law enforcement, or unfairly treated by 
law enforcement, and cannot see judges and attorneys in the system who look like they do? They 
will be more likely to follow the law if they had a meaningful and positive experience with the 
legal system. See id. at 63–64 nn.181–84 (citing studies on perceived fairness). According to 
scholar Emily Buss, “giving young people experience taking responsibility and exercising 
decision-making authority can enhance their social, emotional, and cognitive development in 
ways that help prepare them to assume positions of responsibility in adulthood.” Id. at 64. 
 234. Id. at 14–15. 
 235. Buss argues for a decoupling of culpability and “‘full’ (adult-style) punishment.” Id. at 
47. 
 236. Id. at 61–62. For instance, for a juvenile who has been found involved in “tagging”—
slang for graffiti vandalism—one developmentally sound response to the offense is participation 
in a graffiti removal program. The offender then learns about the consequences of his behavior by 
having to see first-hand the work involved in repairing the damage he or she caused. See 
Henning, supra note 9, at 1151–53, for examples of successful community-based programs, both 
with juveniles and adults. 
 237. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective on Serious 
Juvenile Crime: When Should Juveniles Be Treated as Adults?, 63 FED. PROBATION 52, 53 
(1999). Steinberg and Cauffman reference juveniles, but this Article uses the term youthful 
offenders because the science relates back to youthful offenders. 
 238. See, e.g., HANEY, supra note 78, at 5–6 (discussing that negative psychological impacts 
of incarceration include “institutionalism” and “prisonization,” meaning that inmates may 
incorporate the “norms of prison life into [] habits of thinking, feeling, and acting”); see also id. 
at 6–7 (younger inmates become institutionalized quicker and easier than adults, and “have little 
in the way of already developed independent judgment, so they have little if anything to revert to 
or rely upon” when they are removed from the institution); id. at 7–8 (negative psychological 
impacts of incarceration include “[h]ypervigilance, interpersonal distrust, and suspicion,” 
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youthful offenders “mature out of criminal behavior.”239 Age-
appropriate sentencing procedures should therefore nurture an 
offender’s potential.240 
B.  How Restorative Justice Responds to Youthful Thinking 
1.  Restorative Justice Generally 
 
Places like South Africa, famous for its Truth and Reconciliation 
hearings,241 come foremost to one’s mind when thinking of 
restorative justice. Restorative justice has been described as being 
“concerned with healing victims’ wounds, restoring offenders to law-
abiding lives, and repairing the harm done to relationships and the 
community.”242 Restorative justice refers to the bringing together of 
offenders and victims to mediate, explain, apologize, forgive, and 
 
meaning that younger prisoners are more likely to display aggressive behavior as a strategy to 
encourage other prisoners to avoid them in order to avoid being dominated, exploited, and 
victimized); id. at 11 (negative psychological impacts of incarceration include “[p]ost-traumatic 
stress reactions to the pains of imprisonment,” meaning the experience of childhood traumas may 
be re-experienced through the form of “re-traumatization” due to the harsh and uncaring 
conditions of incarceration); Johnson & Miller, supra note 29, at 109 (“For a juvenile who serves 
long years of confinement as a lifer, prison becomes life as they know it, making it almost certain 
that they will fail to develop into adults ‘with a mature understanding of their own humanity.’”). 
 239. Henning, supra note 9, at 1122. Frank Zimring proposes that the best response to 
juvenile crime is to let adolescents grow up and grow out of it. Franklin E. Zimring, William G. 
Simon Professor of Law and Wolfen Distinguished Scholar, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley Sch. of 
Law, Address at the Loyola Law School Symposium: Juveniles and the Supreme Court (Oct. 12, 
2012). See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 
(1982). 
 240. See Buss, supra note 13, at 47, 51. 
 241. Ishaan Tharoor, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Top 10 Trials 
That Shook the World, TIME (Apr. 08, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article 
/0,28804,2064099_2064107_2064426,00.html. 
 242. Conflict Info. Consortium, Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, Restorative Justice, THE 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION INFO. SOURCE, http://www.crinfo.org/bi-essay/restorative-justice (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2013). John Braithwaite, the leading scholar in the field, believes the “most 
acceptable working definition” of restorative justice offered at the Working Party on Restorative 
Justice of the Alliance of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice in 1997 by Tony Marshall, is “a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a 
particular offense come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the 
offense and its implications for the future.” John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing 
Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST.: A REV. OF RES. 1, 5 (quoting definition 
of restorative justice formulated by Tony Marshall) (internal quotation marks omitted). It should 
be noted that Braithwaite felt the definition was limited, stating “it does not tell us who or what is 
to be restored . . . [and] does not define core values of restorative justice.” Id. at 6. 
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heal.243 There are many different models, and variations on those 
models.244 When I refer to restorative justice in this Article, I am 
referring to mediation or conferencing, a restorative justice process 
in which an offender meets his victim face-to-face, and they talk 
about what happened in an attempt to understand one another’s 
perspectives and to appreciate a common humanity.245 Often, today’s 
criminal defendant was yesterday’s—and will be tomorrow’s—
victim. Victims of crimes are often from the same community as the 
perpetrators and have frequently been offenders in the past.246 
2.  Restorative Justice as an Alternative to Punishment 
The pure view of restorative justice encompasses a belief that 
incarceration is harmful and alienating to offenders, and ineffective 
at reducing crime.247 One of the “primary objective[s] of 
 
 243. See Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of 
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 227–28 (2003). 
 244. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 130–31 (providing examples of four different 
models: “Victim-offender mediation brings offenders (especially juveniles) and victims face to 
face. Community reparative boards allow panels of trained citizens to discuss crimes with 
offenders and agree on restitution plans. Family group conferences bring together the families of 
offenders and victims to discuss crimes, mediated by a trained facilitator. Sentencing circles allow 
victims, offenders, the friends and family of both, community members, and justice professionals 
to deliberate and agree upon a sentence.”); GORDON BAZEMORE & MARK UMBREIT, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN: A COMPARISON OF FOUR RESTORATIVE 
CONFERENCING MODELS 2–6 (Feb. 2001) (discussing the same four models of (1) victim-
offender mediation; (2) community reparative boards; (3) family group conferencing; and (4) 
circle sentencing); see also FRANK J. REMINGTON CTR., RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROJECT, 
http://law.wisc.edu/fjr/rjp/ (describing the University of Wisconsin Law School’s Restorative 
Justice Project). 
 245. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 114–15 (describing “a face-to-face interaction 
between offender and offended as essential to effective expressions of remorse and apology” 
because such interactions “allow nuanced communication that contextualizes the offender’s crime 
and the harm done”). 
 246. See LINDA G. MILLS, VIOLENT PARTNERS: A BREAKTHROUGH PLAN FOR ENDING THE 
CYCLE OF ABUSE 85–90 (2009) (explaining how a child who has been directly abused by his 
parents is significantly more likely to become a violent adult; showing that the cycle of abuse and 
violence is ongoing); Henning, supra note 9, at 1144 n.227 (“Statistics from 2004 show that as 
many as two-thirds of victims of juvenile violent crime are children.”); see also Arredondo, supra 
note 26, at 27–28 (describing how children in the juvenile justice system are “oftentimes [the] 
most highly victimized youth,” and explaining the psychosocial challenges of trans-generational 
neglect and criminal system involvement). 
 247. See Luna, supra note 35, at 4 (“[R]estorativism laments the barbaric conditions of many 
modern prisons, with restorative practices minimizing or altogether rejecting the use of 
incarceration as inhumane and criminogenic.”). Howard Zehr has modified his earlier hard-line 
position that there should be no incarceration to say that such traditional forms of sentences may 
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restorativism is making amends for the offending, particularly the 
harm caused to the victim, rather than inflicting pain upon the 
offender.”248 Purists oppose incarceration as a cruel and ineffective 
mechanism to deal with the problem of crime.249 In the view of John 
Braithwaite, restorative justice should be defined as an alternative to 
the punishment-centered model of criminal justice.250 Some in the 
field see restorative justice as an end in and of itself.251 Opponents of 
 
need to exist as a fallback or last resort. See HOWARD ZEHR, LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE 12–13 (2002) (“If restorative justice were taken seriously, our reliance on prisons would 
be reduced and the nature of prisons would change significantly. However, restorative justice 
approaches may also be used in conjunction with, or parallel to, prison sentences. They are not 
necessarily an alternative to incarceration.”); see also Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 121 
(quoting Braithwaite’s view that “[r]estorative justice is most commonly defined by what it is an 
alternative to, namely the punishment-centered justice model” (citing John Braithwaite, Assessing 
Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, in 25 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 4 
(Michael Tonry ed., 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); John Braithwaite, Holism, 
Justice, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 389, 391 (2003) (“I cannot see how one can nurture 
restorative values like mercy and forgiveness while taking retributive proportionality seriously.”). 
 248. Luna, supra note 35, at 3. In recent years, the victims’ rights movement has embraced 
the term restorative justice, while changing its original meaning. Some restorative justice 
programs advanced by victims’ rights groups are punishment-oriented with retributive goals and 
designs to exact pain and suffering from offenders. See Henning, supra note 9, at 1130. By 
adopting the term restorative justice, victims have changed its original or true meaning so that one 
must be careful and precise in order to understand who is advancing an agenda of restorative 
justice and in order to know what it truly means in that context. See ZEHR, supra note 247, at 6 
(acknowledging that “[w]ith more and more programs being termed ‘restorative justice,’ the 
meaning of that phrase is sometimes diluted or confused”). 
  Critics of the unbridled use of victim impact statements have voiced concerns about the 
influence and emotional impact that victims may have on prosecutors and judges. See Henning, 
supra note 9, at 1139–40. Discussing the danger of court reliance on victim impact statements in 
juvenile court sentencing procedures, Henning says: “First, these statements hinder the court’s 
evaluation of the child’s often diminished culpability in delinquent behavior. Second, they 
distract the court’s attention from the important goal of rehabilitation by placing a 
disproportionate emphasis on the emotional appeal of the victim and any apparent lack of remorse 
shown by the child.” Id. at 1135 (footnote omitted). 
In one case I worked on, a victim wrote, 
I hope that [the offender] will be made to live in a system of fear that mirrors the prison 
of fear and hopelessness I have been made to live [in] for the past year. . . . One of the 
ways we can save others from this terror is to ensure that [the offender] is locked away 
in a prison away from persons that are trying to make this life a safe one for all. 
Victim Impact Statement (on file with the author). 
 249. See Luna, supra note 35, at 2–4. 
 250. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 103 (stating that restorative justice “does not 
seek to reform criminal procedure” but rather should be seen as a “complete alternative[] to 
punishment”). 
 251. See id. This Article does not propose that restorative justice means no consequences for 
the offender. Some scholars view restorative justice as the opposite of punishment; however, this 
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this pure form of restorative justice have concerns that the process is 
too offender-focused.252 
3.  Youthful Offenders and Restorative Justice 
 
Youthful offenders are ideal targets when instituting restorative 
justice programs. They are the least culpable because their immature 
thought, impulsivity, recklessness, and susceptibility to influence is 
typical of their age group, and is not reflective of ingrained and 
intractable thoughtlessness. They are the most promising target 
group for rehabilitative efforts because their character and 
development are still transitory and not yet complete.253 
Because children and young adults have a tendency for 
impulsivity that is biologically predetermined,254 this group is an 
ideal population for the implementation of targeted restorative justice 
projects designed to improve decision-making and provide an 
opportunity to appreciate the consequences that flow from their 
conduct. Restorative justice allows the time to stop and contemplate 
what happened. Youth who made poor decisions to commit crimes in 
moments of impulsivity can slow down and reflect in a calm 
environment, away from peer and time pressure. 
Youth also have little experience putting their decision-making 
skills in action. Restorative justice provides an opportunity for the 
development of the skill of reflecting upon mistakes to learn from 
them. The opportunity for youthful offenders to consider in hindsight 
how they came to make a poor decision—how they failed to 
accurately anticipate risks and to maturely and accurately weigh the 
risks and rewards of a given course of action—is an integral part of a 
restorative justice process guided by mature adults. Restorative 
 
Article does propose that the consequences that follow a true offense should not always equal 
punishment in the form of incarceration. 
 252. See ZEHR, supra note 247, at 6 (“All too often, victim groups fear, restorative justice 
efforts have been motivated mainly by a desire to work with offenders in a more positive way.”). 
 253. See Henning, supra note 9, at 1132 (arguing that victim input and participation in 
rehabilitative justice processes that are properly used with juvenile offenders could enhance the 
rehabilitation process). There is also an appropriateness of the timing of offering victim impact 
statements. Id. at 1147; see also supra Part II.B. 
 254. See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also Brief for the AMA et al., Miller, 
supra note 3, at 6–14. 
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justice programming provides opportunities for discussions about 
how one might have handled a tough decision in what was a “hot” 
situation—where there were both peer and time pressures. Youthful 
offenders have the opportunity in a restorative justice program to see 
how they might have handled a tough situation differently and how 
they can do better next time so that the poor decision-making 
demonstrated in the commission of a crime does not define the 
offender and his or her future choices. 
Offenders will also have the opportunity to apologize. The very 
act of apology teaches youthful offenders255 because it is an 
expression of sorrow and regret256 that promotes genuine 
repentance257 and reinforces social norms.258 After understanding 
what the impacts of his or her crime have been, an offender can take 
responsibility for the effects of his or her actions on the victim. 
Studies on the impact of an apology show that even those who are 
initially not amenable to participating in restorative justice wind up 
benefitting and apologizing after they have participated.259 Through 
the process, offenders can develop empathy, compassion, remorse, 
and a desire for change.260 This is a critical step on the road to 
rehabilitation, one that is largely ignored by the functioning of the 
American criminal justice system today.261 
 
 255. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 143 & n.288. 
 256. Id. at 90. 
 257. Id. at 125. 
 258. Id. at 114, 144 & n.294. 
 259. Id. at 116. 
 260. See Arredondo, supra note 26, at 21 (describing why restorative justice mediations are 
appropriate tools to teach offenders about empathy because, while some youthful offenders may 
lack experience with empathy, they have the capacity to learn empathy); Henning, supra note 9, 
at 1151 (arguing that rehabilitative justice sentencing is an opportunity to teach young offenders 
empathy). 
 261. See Garvey, supra note 7, at 1804. Garvey discusses the stages of a secular process of 
atonement that he endorses. Garvey says that there are two stages: expiation of the offender and 
reconciliation by the victim. Id. In turn, expiation involves four steps: repentance, apology, 
reparation, and penance. Id. As a prerequisite to any form of expiation (defined by Merriam-
Webster’s dictionary as “the means by which atonement is made”), one must understand one’s 
actions before one can truly go through stages of repentance and apology. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 801 (3d ed. 1986). Without an opportunity to understand the 
impact of one’s actions, one cannot get to expiation, for how can one repent and apologize for 
something one did not think through and something for which one still does not understand the 
consequences? 
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Restorative justice is a particularly good approach for youthful 
offenders who are caught in a cycle of violence. Acts of violence are 
warped efforts to right a previous wrong.262 Young people especially 
find it easier to continue antisocial behavior if they can tell 
themselves that others in their community are against them.263 An 
effective restorative justice process eliminates the opportunity for an 
offender to tell himself that everyone is against him by 
simultaneously emphasizing care amongst the participants and 
accountability for that offender’s actions.264 
Restorative justice as a concept is an appropriate response to 
youthful offending because it directly addresses problems associated 
with adolescent thinking, teaches prosocial thinking, nurtures more 
mature decision-making processes, and interrupts the destructive 
thought processes associated with a cycle of violence. 
C.  Proposal for a Specific Developmentally Appropriate, 
Community-Based Sentence Incorporating Restorative Justice 
Programming 
1.  Marcus’s Story265 
 
When he was twenty-one years old, Marcus robbed four of the 
nicest people on the planet at gunpoint. It was the summer of 2005, 
and the crisis in Darfur was a major human rights issue.266 One of 
the four nicest people on the planet was leaving for Darfur the next 
day. One was a teacher for Teach For America. The other two 
people were a young married couple who had moved to a struggling 
neighborhood out of a sense of civic-mindedness. The couple also 
volunteered as mentors for a young foster care child in the 
neighborhood. 
 
262.   JAMES GILLIGAN, VIOLENCE: REFLECTIONS ON A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC (1997). 
 263. Id. 
 264. See Paul Tullis, Can Forgiveness Play a Role in Criminal Justice?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/magazine/can-forgiveness-play-a-role-in-criminal-
justice.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 265. Although Marcus is not his real name, all details of this story are real and unchanged. 
Unless otherwise noted, all facts and quotations within this part are from the Author’s experience 
and account. 
 266. See Marc Lacey, The Mournful Math of Darfur: The Dead Don’t Add Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 18, 2005, at A4. 
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Marcus stole six dollars from these four people. He confessed 
immediately after being arrested, even talking more about other 
wrongdoings—offenses for which the police did not arrest Marcus 
and about which the police did not ask him.267 Marcus used a BB 
gun, not a gun capable of killing anyone. He had the gun and the 
proceeds in his possession at the time of arrest, the victims identified 
him, and he confessed. Marcus was brought to court and charged 
with four counts of armed robbery and four counts of the possession 
of a firearm during a crime of violence. He faced mandatory 
minimums of five years for each offense of armed robbery—one for 
each of the four nicest people on the planet. 
This is when I entered the picture as his attorney. Marcus was 
scared and seemed young and very immature for someone whose 
birthday made him twenty-one years old.268 While Marcus was held 
in jail pretrial and during that time, I visited him regularly and got to 
know him. I learned that he had moved to the neighborhood where 
he committed the robbery in order to help out his aging 
grandmother. Marcus felt lonely and did not know anyone in his 
grandmother’s neighborhood, a place that was tougher than the 
neighborhood where he had grown up. His mother and family 
thought he should live with his grandmother so that he could take 
care of her and protect her. 
At the time, no one in Marcus’s family knew what I later learned 
from a psychologist—Marcus was functioning well below normal for 
his age, even in areas where he scored better academically, and he 
had little ability to apply his knowledge to everyday life 
circumstances. For instance, he could not calculate how to make 
change or estimate the cost of a half dozen of something when he 
was given the cost of a dozen of the same item. Marcus’s personality 
 
 267. See Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 11 (1997) (describing how young people do not understand the Miranda 
warnings). 
 268. Because Marcus was under twenty-two years of age, he was eligible for a sentence under 
the District of Columbia’s Youth Rehabilitation Act. See Youth Rehabilitation Act, D.C. CODE 
§ 24-901(6) (2001). This act allowed for youthful adult offenders to earn a chance to seal their 
adult record upon successful completion of the imposed sentence. See id. § 24-903. Under D.C. 
law, an emerging adult, like Marcus, was recognized to have greater potential than a fully mature 
adult. Thus, the law offered emerging adults in his age category the opportunity to recover from 
his adjudication. 
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testing showed that he had low self-esteem and felt incompetent, 
lonely, and anxious. He had a tendency to turn to others for guidance 
and follow their direction without much critical thought of his own. 
These findings meant that Marcus was tremendously susceptible to 
peer pressure and bad influences. As it turns out, Marcus was the 
worst possible person for his family to choose to send to live with his 
grandmother. Marcus did not function well in the tougher 
neighborhood, looking to his peers there for examples of how to 
behave. He did not do well without any support and with the 
expectation that he was going to be the tough man. His frailty was 
apparent to me, but of course I met him when he was in an orange 
jumpsuit, scared out of his mind, and behind bars. 
Marcus also told me about the first time that he had tried to 
commit a robbery—it was in this same neighborhood a few months 
earlier. Marcus used the same BB gun that he used to commit the 
robbery for which he was arrested, but this purported victim was a 
bit savvier than the four people in the case just described. His 
purported victim told Marcus to put the gun away, said he was not 
scared of Marcus, and asked Marcus if he needed anything. The man 
then went into his home, got twenty dollars, came back outside, and 
gave the twenty dollars to Marcus. Marcus felt embarrassed. Marcus 
then tried again and attempted to rob a female victim. The woman 
simply told him no, told him to put the gun away, and then walked off 
without incident. Neither of these attempted robberies was reported 
to the police. To Marcus, these attempts felt like failures. He felt like 
he was not capable of what was expected of him as an adult male in 
his new community. 
I knew from meeting with Marcus and from my experience as a 
high school teacher who had worked with adolescents with learning 
disabilities that he was unsophisticated and not functioning at or 
near a grade level that one would expect even of a middle-school 
aged youth. As it turns out, Marcus was reading at a second grade 
level and had been a victim of educational neglect in the D.C. public 
school system. He was a child who had been identified as having 
special needs, and the D.C. public school system had failed to deliver 
the services and support to which Marcus was entitled. Indeed, 
during Marcus’s educational career, D.C. schools had, for a time, 
been under receivership by the federal government because of just 
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how poorly they were doing at educating their students.269 Marcus 
had also been bullied and beaten up at school as a youth. I referred 
Marcus’s case to an education attorney who sued the school system 
for compensatory educational services in order to make up for the 
system’s failures. He won and was awarded services—services that 
he was only entitled to access through his twenty-first year and 
services which would be completely inaccessible if he were to spend 
time in federal prison, a destination toward which he was certainly 
headed because it is where all D.C. prisoners go to serve their 
sentences. 
Due to mitigating evidence I had developed, my persistence with 
the prosecuting attorney, and Marcus’s willingness to take early 
responsibility, Marcus was the recipient of an uncharacteristically 
beneficial plea deal.270 Yet, despite this accomplishment, Marcus still 
faced a prison sentence. The voluntary sentencing guidelines 
suggested his minimum sentence should be two years. The statute for 
the lead and most serious offense to which he pled—robbery—did 
not carry a mandatory minimum, but rather a “soft minimum,” 
which is a provision stating that if Marcus was sentenced to any 
prison, the minimum prison term was two years. Further, I was 
bound by the terms of the plea deal not to advocate for a sentence 
under the guideline range. It looked pretty bleak.271 
In between his plea and sentencing I attended a presentence 
interview of Marcus, who was being questioned by a probation 
officer.272 The interview was conducted over video. In addition to 
 
 269. Michael Powell & Vernon Loeb, In Lieu of Planning, Patchwork, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 
1997, at A01 (discussing the receivership of the D.C. public school system by the federal 
government). 
 270. The assistant United States attorney prosecuting the case actually told me that he had 
never had a defense lawyer make him do so much work for a plea. Although I believe that it is 
attitudes such as this one that compound the overarching problem of youthful offenders in 
detention, that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 271. I remember talking to the education attorney and social worker on Marcus’s case saying 
that we needed to figure out a way to get him out of jail and out from under a prison sentence, and 
that I was thinking creatively about it. The social worker spoke to me privately after the meeting 
and told me that she was worried that I was going to be disappointed because my goal was 
impossible. 
 272. In many ways this story is also about access to justice—it was unusual for public 
defenders and other defense attorneys to regularly attend these interviews. They were held at the 
jail at inconvenient times for attorneys with matters in court, and it was a huge time commitment. 
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attending the interview, I made comments to the probation officer 
about Marcus’s case for his written presentence report and spoke to 
the officer on the phone trying to convince him of how much 
potential Marcus demonstrated. I also reached out to the 
complainants again.273 I talked to Marcus about it, and he asked me 
to convey to the victims that he was very sorry for what he had done. 
As it turns out, the couple was very appreciative of his apology 
through me. They asked me about Marcus, and, with his permission, 
I shared some of the details about him. Unbelievably, these lovely 
people wanted to meet Marcus and hear his apology face-to-face. It 
was a risky move for a defense attorney before a sentencing hearing 
to take two armed robbery victims to the jail to meet my client, but I 
did it. It was not easy. On our first attempt, the corrections officers 
were suspicious and contacted the warden. The two white individuals 
at the nearly all black D.C. jail stuck out like sore thumbs. Despite 
my pleading with the warden, she said “not without a court order.” 
So next, I endeavored to obtain a court order. The prosecuting 
attorney thought that this was an insane idea and objected 
vigorously on and off the record. He called the victims at home and 
told them that Marcus was a dangerous and violent criminal. 
Nevertheless, the judge granted my request. I was able to take the 
complainants with me to meet Marcus face-to-face in an attorney-
client visiting room rather than meeting him through plexiglass over 
a telephone.274 
What transpired was one of the most amazing experiences of my 
life and is the inspiration for this Article. It was restorative justice in 
action. Marcus apologized to the victims, and they forgave him. 
Marcus and the two victims realized that they all knew someone in 
common from their shared neighborhood—a woman who had been 
shot and killed. They remarked about what a tragedy it was, as well 
as how nice of a person she was, and they affirmed that they all 
 
Consequently, even great lawyers did not make it a practice to attend these interviews. However, 
it sure made a difference in the outcome of clients’ cases when their attorneys were present. 
 273. Of course, during the investigation phase of the case prior to taking a plea or trying a 
case, one reaches out to complainants as well. The man going to Darfur was in Darfur. The Teach 
for America fellow was now off teaching somewhere else in America. That left the couple. The 
officer had said to me that the couple had asked questions about who my client was so it seemed 
that reaching out to them could be useful. 
 274. The face-to-face meeting was only possible because of the court order. 
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wanted to live in a place where there were no random acts of 
violence like her killing. Through this process, they developed a 
greater sense of community and realized that they all wanted to live 
in the same type of society—a safe one. The victims, previously 
frightened by what had seemed to them like a monster with a gun, 
saw that his appearance was just a facade. When they met Marcus in 
jail, the couple encountered a scared and slouchy young man who 
seemed more cowed than menacing. They understood that Marcus 
was in fact a victim of educational neglect, that he was insecure, and 
that he was a scared young man. Marcus was not a scary monster 
anymore. 
The victims also saw the jail—they saw the type of dirty and 
dank environment where Marcus was being housed. When they had 
come to the jail on the first attempted visit, it made an impression on 
them that all the folks who had come to visit their family members 
had to just wait and wait in line to get inside and that absolutely 
everyone else there was poor and black. To those unfamiliar with the 
conditions of American jails and prisons, confronted with the reality 
of what those facilities are like, it is hard to imagine that 
incarceration is a place where reform is encouraged or even 
possible.275 
Marcus realized that the robbery he had committed had a 
significant impact on his victims. The victims told Marcus about 
what a hassle it was to be robbed—how they had to change the keys 
to their home, get new credit cards and licenses, and waste a lot of 
time. More importantly, they spoke about how scared they were 
during and after the robbery. They expressed how it had made them 
question where they had chosen to live and even their altruistic 
reasons for moving to their neighborhood (they wanted to invest in 
that community). Marcus learned that since the robbery the woman 
had been carrying mace around with her, and he learned that by 
robbing her, he had taken her sense of security from her. The couple 
 
 275. At the sentencing hearing, one of the victims said, “If he spends much more time in 
prison around hardened criminals and gets back on the street after that, we and our neighbors may 
meet him again, but that time the gun may be something more than a broken BB gun, and we 
don’t want to see that happen.” 
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asked Marcus for advice about mentoring the foster child and how to 
keep him from falling off track. 
In the end, it was this couple, two of the nicest people on earth, 
who came to court and pleaded with the judge to give Marcus a 
chance in the community. They met Marcus’s mother. They 
understood a bit more about where Marcus came from and what 
would happen to him if he continued to be incarcerated—he would 
lose educational services accessible to him only in the community, 
and he would be in an environment that, even from their brief 
exposure, they knew and could see was not a place in which one 
grows and matures into a productive and law-abiding citizen. They 
saw Marcus as a person, as someone for whom there was hope. They 
were not sure he would succeed in the community, but they were sure 
that they wanted him to have a shot. They were rooting for Marcus to 
succeed. They were invested in his success. They said in court, 
We would like to ask humbly, but somewhat insistently, 
that today you give [Marcus] a chance to make something 
of himself. We’d like to ask this both for his sake, and for 
our sake, and for the sake of the community . . . we’d like to 
ask you that you do everything in your power to get 
[Marcus] into school, not prison, as soon as humanly 
possible. 
Marcus said a few words, meekly asking for a chance to do 
better in the future, but his words were few and far less powerful 
than those of the victims. 
In this case, the judge bravely sentenced Marcus to a term of 
probation with a suspended jail sentence should he violate 
probation; a sentence below even the guidelines.276 Because of the 
work done by the special education attorney to whom I had referred 
Marcus, he was able to attend a fancy private school in D.C. while 
he remained in the community. 
 
 
 
 276. A sentence of probation did not trigger the “soft” minimum of two years in jail. 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL CODE REVISION COMMISSION, 
VOLUNTARY SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3.3 (2012), http://acs.dc.gov/acs/frames.asp? 
doc=/acs/lib/acs/pdf/2012_Voluntary_Sentencing_Guidelines_Manual.pdf. 
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2.  Proposal for a Developmentally Responsive Community-Based 
Sentence Incorporating Restorative Justice Programming 
 
Naturally, there must be a selection process to identify youthful 
offenders who should be considered for restorative justice 
programming at the sentencing phase. At one end of the spectrum, 
one could argue that each and every youthful offender under twenty-
five who has been adjudicated or convicted of a robbery offense 
should be eligible. On the other end of the spectrum is a limited 
eligibility program, which could run afoul of the sorting problems 
aforementioned. A limited eligibility program might exclude all but 
first time offenders. Instead, maximizing diversion from prison and 
jail to participate in the program—even for those offenders who have 
priors, and especially for those who have never previously 
participated in a restorative justice program—would maximize the 
learning opportunities for all offenders and could have the greatest 
potential impact on recidivism outcomes.277 
The restorative justice programming should be implemented in 
three important stages. The first stage is a preparatory stage where 
offenders and victims separately prepare to engage in mediation with 
one another. Second is a victim-offender mediation or conference. In 
the third stage, offenders should have some opportunity to focus on 
the lessons learned in the mediation phase. These three stages of 
restorative justice programming would accompany probation 
supervision and, ideally, evidence-based practices demonstrated to 
improve outcomes for youthful offenders.278 The services provided 
 
 277. Additionally, there is a built-in safeguard: should the offender fail in the community, he 
would face the potential implementation of the significant prison sentence he faces under existing 
law. 
 278. Evidence-based practices are interventions that have been proven to be effective at 
addressing the root causes of crime and delinquency. Evidence- and community-based programs 
lead to a reduction in recidivism rates. Peter Greenwood, Prevention and Intervention Programs 
for Juvenile Offenders, 18 FUTURE CHILD 185, 199 (2008); BALCK supra note 60, at 14 
(evidence-based community programs should be individually tailored to a specific offender’s 
needs). “[V]irtually all effective evidence-based practices occur in the community and at home.” 
Arredondo, supra note 26, at 22 (emphasis omitted). One example of an evidence-based practice 
deemed an effective intervention is functional family therapy, which “provides a $49,766 net 
benefit to crime victims and taxpayers per participant and reduces a juvenile’s recidivism rate by 
18.1 percent.” BALCK supra note 60, at 14. Other examples of evidence- and community-based 
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through probation should be informed by and improved by 
information gleaned during the restorative justice programming. For 
instance, an offender who shares information about a past trauma in 
the course of the mediation should have counseling provided to deal 
with that trauma. 
The preparation stage should be designed to educate both parties 
about the process of mediation, and this could be done in classes and 
in individual meetings with mediators.279 Instructors who are trained 
mediators would teach offenders and victims about what it means to 
have a neutral mediator, the rules of mediation, the safe space of 
mediation, the goals of mediation, and generally about good 
communication habits.280 General instruction could take place in 
classes, and then individual preparatory meetings could take place 
with the mediators in that case. There would likely have to be 
separate, general classes for offenders and victims at this stage, but 
this work could be done in small groups, to make it efficient. 
Offenders would need to learn about some common pitfalls of 
mediation and some important tips to foster good communication—
for instance, how important eye contact, posture, and attitude are; 
how to refer to others in a formal setting; how important it is to be 
open in sharing negative and painful emotions and experiences of 
their own; and specifically how to express those emotions, including 
 
interventions include Multi-dimensional Treatment Foster Care, Multi-Systemic Therapy, and 
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy. Id. MTFC costs about $7,000 per youth more than a group home 
placement; however, the benefits are tremendous: the Washington State Institute for Public Policy 
found that MTFC yields $33,000 in criminal justice system savings and $52,000 in benefits to 
potential crime victims. Greenwood, supra, at 201. In Ohio, counties that implemented Project 
RECLAIM (“Reasoned Equitable Community and Local Alternatives to the Incarceration of 
Minors”) decreased their commitments of juveniles to secure facilities where juveniles were 
incarcerated by 42.7 percent in its first year. Instead, the juveniles were diverted to evidence- and 
community-based programs such as day treatment, alternative schools, intensive probation, 
electronic monitoring, and residential treatment. See States Strategize to Keep Systemic Reform 
Efforts on Track, MODELS FOR CHANGE, http://www.modelsforchange.net/newsroom/308 (last 
visited July 2, 2013). 
 279. Separate meetings with the mediator in order to prepare with both parties are a part of the 
DOJ guidelines for victim-offender mediation. See MARK S. UMBREIT & JEAN GREENWOOD, 
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM-SENSITIVE VICTIM-
OFFENDER MEDIATION: RESTORATIVE JUSTICE THROUGH DIALOGUE 39 (2000), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/reports/96517-gdlines_victims-sens/welcome.html. 
 280. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 87–90; Henning, supra note 9, at 1163 
(discussing what is to be gained by delaying apology until after there has been some training and 
preparation). 
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an apology. This is all part of empathy-building and victim-
awareness curricula that already exist.281 Offenders might even role-
play in those offender-only classes in preparation for their 
mediations. On the other hand, to promote victim sensitivity to 
offenders, victims may need to be educated about where an offender 
is coming from, what an offender’s education level is, and what 
racial or community differences exist. Individual meetings with the 
mediator should then prepare each party for the next step and ensure 
trust with the mediator.282 
Victim-offender mediation is the second stage. This is like what 
happened in the jail during the meeting between Marcus and the 
couple that he robbed. However, unlike what happened in Marcus’s 
case,283 the mediation should be led by a trained and professional 
mediator or a neutral party who was also involved in the preparation 
phase. At this stage, because it was part of a sentence, attorneys 
would not be required to participate to protect the rights of the 
probationer.284 
The third stage is a debriefing stage to focus on what lessons 
offenders have learned.285 This phase could again be conducted in 
class-settings, to make it efficient. Offenders should be given an 
opportunity to express what they learned about the impact of their 
 
 281. See Henning, supra note 9, at 1162 & n.323 (citing BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR 
VICTIM IMPACT PANELS WITHIN PENNSYLVANIA’S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 7); see also 
UMBREIT & GREENWOOD, supra note 283. 
 282. Henning, supra note 9, at 1163 (“[A] trained mediator who meets with the offending 
child before the victim-offender conference may help the child better articulate his feelings and 
avoid off-putting behaviors such as lowered eyes and mumbling. Because the victim’s perception 
of the offender will determine how the apology is received, the offender’s non-verbal ‘cues,’ such 
as eye contact, facial expressions, and body posture are important.”). 
 283. Most defense lawyers, and public defenders especially, would not have the time, 
training, or resources to take on such a labor-intensive role as mediating between their clients and 
victims of crime. It is not a good or sustainable solution to have an expectation of lawyers to be 
involved in this way. 
 284. To promote openness, there would of course need to be binding legal safeguards. 
Nothing the offender shares during the mediation would be used either directly or indirectly to 
prosecute him or her for crimes. An offender should also have the opportunity to talk with his 
defense attorney about any concerns prior to agreeing to such a program as a part of his or her 
sentence. 
 285. In an ideal and pure restorative justice process, victims would have their own classes to 
debrief and follow-up programming to provide them with needed counseling and services. In this 
Proposal, my focus is on rehabilitating the offender through a court-ordered program so I am 
focusing on what should be ordered for the offender. 
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crime on the victims and on society. In some restorative justice 
programs, offenders attend victim panels where victims express how 
the crime impacted them. Such panels could be useful at this stage, 
as could offender panels where offenders present to one another what 
it is that they learned. Offenders could express their hopes and goals 
for the future. It would be important to work through the offender’s 
emotional experience of the mediation with victims with some 
mature adult guidance and support. 
These three stages of restorative justice programming should 
complement and be fully integrated into the probationary sentence. 
Most probationers are court ordered to participate in some type of 
counseling, especially those in juvenile court. All probationers have 
to check in with assigned probation officers. Counselors should be 
encouraged to work with offenders on both the preparation and 
debriefing phases of mediation. Further, both counselors and 
probation officers should provide follow-up referrals for appropriate 
programming to address needs that surfaced during the restorative 
justice programming. 
 
3.  Restorative Justice in Practice: Lessons from Marcus’s Story 
 
Apologizing demonstrates that an offender accepts social norms 
and understands that his behavior was not acceptable.286 Apology 
had a positive impact on the victims and Marcus.287 Both the victims 
and Marcus benefitted from some advance preparation and 
understanding of one another’s circumstances before meeting face-
to-face. With Marcus’s permission, I shared sympathetic details from 
his past and information about his limited intellectual functioning. 
 
 286. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 113; Henning, supra note 9, at 1148. 
 287. Further, the victim may obtain a sense of closure through the apology process. Apologies 
are meaningful to victims, and offenders apologize more frequently in victim-offender mediations 
than they do in court. See Henning, supra note 9, at 1162–63 & n.327. Done responsibly, 
restorative justice can have a positive psychosocial impact on offenders. Offenders report that 
they feel better about restorative justice mediations than about the traditional criminal justice 
courtroom experience. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 116–17, 131; see also Braithwaite, 
supra note 247, at 393 (“Most cultures and most religions encompass the notion of the grace that 
can come of giving a gift to one who has wronged us in instead of exacting a punishment.”). 
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This enabled the victims to connect with him and to appreciate that 
he might not be as articulate as otherwise expected. 
Marcus and his victims had very different backgrounds and life 
experiences.288 When the victims came to the jail, they saw the racial 
composition of the inmates and families who came to visit. They 
began to appreciate how overwhelming it would be for a young man 
in Marcus’s position to see so many young people from his 
community incarcerated, how race might impact Marcus’s own 
perceptions of opportunities available to him, and how their 
Caucasian race could be a barrier to connection.289 They also realized 
that they had something in common—an experience from their 
shared community. Marcus and the victims bonded over their 
feelings of sadness for the loss of a neighbor who had died in a 
random act of violence.290 
Remorse is a difficult and painful emotion.291 Youthful 
offenders might not have the intellectual ability or emotional 
capacity to express themselves—they do not have the same range of 
emotions as a developed adult and do not know how to deal with 
 
 288. Unlike the victims in this case—who were “pure” victims—many victims were also 
criminal defendants at some point themselves. Participating in restorative justice programming 
has the potential to reduce the cycle of violence. People who do not resolve traumas are more 
likely to become future victimizers and pass along that cycle of violence to the next generation. 
See ZEHR, supra note 247, at 30–32 (generally talking about offenders as victims). Zehr explains 
that “much crime may be a response to—an effort to undo—a sense of victimization.” Id. at 31; 
see id. 30–31 & n.3 (referring to Harvard professor and former prison psychiatrist James Gilligan 
who argued that “all violence is an effort to achieve justice or to undo injustice”). Zehr also 
argues that “unresolved trauma tends to be reenacted. If it is not adequately dealt with, trauma is 
reenacted in the lives of those who experience the trauma, in their families, even in future 
generations.” Id. at 31; see also id. at 31 n.4 (citing SANDRA L. BLOOM, CREATING SANCTUARY 
TOWARD THE EVOLUTION OF SANE SOCIETIES 30–31 (1997)); accord LINDA G. MILLS, VIOLENT 
PARTNERS: A BREAKTHROUGH PLAN FOR ENDING THE CYCLE OF ABUSE 85–90 (2009) 
(explaining how a child who has been directly abused by his parents is significantly more likely 
to become a violent adult; showing that the cycle of abuse and violence is ongoing). 
 289. A victim who has participated in such a program has the opportunity to learn about what 
challenges the offender faces in his or her life. The victim may, as a result, be better educated 
about societal problems and motivated to be more involved in community. See generally Robert 
Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of “Community”, 1 UTAH L. REV. 343 (2003) 
(acknowledging difficulties in the term “community” in this context). 
 290. The victims in Marcus’s case were from the same immediate community, but they came 
from very different backgrounds and still were situated in different socioeconomic castes. Often, 
victims and defendants are from the same marginalized communities and have similar 
socioeconomic statuses. 
 291. See Henning, supra note 9, at 1150. 
 
Spring 2013] YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS 871 
 
uncomfortable and overwhelming emotions in an appropriate way.292 
There is a danger that those offenders with the most sympathetic and 
deprived pasts will present themselves as the most hardened, least 
empathetic, and least amendable to rehabilitation.293 Preparation 
before a mediation can help them address these shortcomings so that 
they can successfully explain their feelings during the mediation. I 
helped Marcus prepare for a successful interaction. I reminded 
Marcus about manners and how to refer to the victims—Mr. X or 
Mrs. X––as sir and ma’am. I told him how important it would be to 
make eye contact, even if it was difficult for him and even when he 
felt humiliated and embarrassed. I encouraged him to share difficult 
experiences and emotions, like expressing his shame. When I told 
Marcus about the woman carrying mace, I asked Marcus to think 
about whether or not she carried mace before he robbed her and 
whether the robbery may continue to impact her sense of safety. 
Marcus was thus able to understand in concrete terms what the mace 
was for and had some time to reflect on the impact of the robbery on 
his victim. When we were in the mediation, Marcus was the one who 
brought up the mace and asked the woman about it. 
The victims saw what jail and prison had to offer Marcus, and 
they were dismayed at his prospects for reform in such a place. In 
conjunction with their concern for safety, they understood that 
Marcus was not the dangerous and wild person that he appeared to be 
on the street with a gun in hand, they understood the life 
circumstances and personal frailties that led Marcus to commit the 
robbery, they saw his potential, and they saw incarceration as a sure 
fire way to squash his potential. Their concern for community safety 
became directed toward getting Marcus help rather than toward 
incarcerating him for punishment’s sake alone. 
There were some roadblocks to implementing a community-
based sentence of probation, such as mandatory minimums, soft 
minimums, and sentencing guidelines. Atypically, I had the benefit 
of a lot of resources—namely, time—to devote to Marcus’s case. 
Access to justice issues and realities about public defender caseloads 
 
 292. See id. at 1149 (“Not every offender will have the mental capacity to experience remorse 
or the intellectual capacity and language skills to convey remorse.”). 
 293. See id.  
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raise questions about how best to implement such a learning 
program, with or without the participation of attorneys and at what 
phase of a case. Attorneys could be roadblocks as well. In Marcus’s 
case, the prosecutor was opposed to Marcus meeting his victims. 
By providing an opportunity to meet with and learn from 
victims, restorative justice processes can inform best practices about 
educating offenders. It was much harder for Marcus to express 
himself in a short sentencing hearing with a lot of pressure. Physical 
and procedural obstacles in the courtroom, such as lack of 
opportunity for eye contact and the presence of strangers, function as 
barriers to true expressions.294 Marcus was not the most sophisticated 
speaker, and his words at the hearing were not impactful. Were it not 
for the opportunity he had to meet with the victims, neither the judge 
nor the victims would ever have understood Marcus’s true remorse. 
Indeed, it is challenging and may take time for a victim to 
overcome resentment and “see offenders as redeemable human 
beings.”295 Creating an opportunity for offenders to understand the 
consequences of their actions is not in and of itself the cure, but it is 
a vital part of a youthful offender’s development.296 Looking at the 
root causes and the individual offender and crafting a consequence 
that is meaningful to victims297 is therefore critical. 
 
 
 294. Id. at 1150 (“Physical and procedural barriers in the courtroom further impede 
meaningful expression and experiences of remorse and apology. The courtroom, for example, is 
rarely set up to facilitate true eye-to-eye contact between the offender and the victim and does not 
provide the child with a safe space in which to explore or experience remorse. The parties, who 
generally speak to the judge instead of each other, are constrained by the limits of the court’s time 
and have little or no meaningful opportunity to understand the other’s plight and emotions. The 
offending child may also feel embarrassed, humiliated, or ostracized in court under the 
intimidating gaze and judgment of the prosecutor, judge, victim, and even his own family.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 295. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 115. 
 296. See id. at 125. Bibas and Bierschbach classify our criminal justice system as a 
“punishment assembly line.” Id. The focus of this assembly line is “on achieving as just an 
outcome as possible for each offender with maximum efficiency” where “procedures speed cases 
through to a mathematically correct disposition.” Id. at 95 (emphasis added). This emphasis on 
efficiency leaves little, if any, opportunity for offenders to truly contemplate the effects their 
actions have on victims, themselves, and the shared community. Id. at 96. That opportunity is as 
much about creating more time and space along the continuum as it is about infusing meaningful 
engagement into the steps along the American criminal process. 
 297. ALEX PIQUERO & LAURENCE STEINBERG, MACARTHUR FOUND., REHABILITATION 
VERSUS INCARCERATION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS: PUBLIC PREFERENCES IN FOUR MODELS 
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V.  RESPONDING TO SKEPTICS 
A.  Skeptics’ Concerns About Effectiveness and Risk 
Skeptics may be concerned about the accuracy of a restorative 
justice process to measure offender remorse, the effectiveness of the 
program to reduce recidivism, and the risk posed by offenders who 
remain in the community. 
Critics have been concerned about incentivizing offenders at this 
stage to feign or fake apology and remorse if it is tied to their 
ultimate sentence.298 Ideally, a successful mediation would not be 
incentivized by or subject to the bias of others judging the sincerity 
and engagement of the participants. Instead, offender and victim 
alike should be free to focus on the tasks of learning, understanding, 
apologizing, forgiving, acknowledging harm, uniting in desire for 
safe and secure neighborhoods, appreciating their shared humanity, 
and shoring up feelings of community. 
First, skeptics should be cautioned against using restorative 
justice to accurately measure a youthful offender’s remorse and 
against linking that perception of remorse to any outcome in his case. 
In Marcus’s story, a restorative justice-style mediation was used as a 
sorting tool to inform sentencing and increase the ability of the 
sentencing judge to accurately capture who Marcus was, gauge his 
remorse, estimate his potential for growth, and incorporate the input 
and experience of the victims. The temptation to use restorative 
justice as a sorting tool at sentencing is great precisely because a 
demonstration of remorse is such a powerful factor at sentencing.299 
 
FOR CHANGE STATES 4 (2007) available at http://www.macfound.org/media/article_pdfs/ 
WILLINGNESSTOPAYFINAL.PDF (“[T]he public clearly favors rehabilitation over 
punishment as a response to serious juvenile offending.”); see also Bibas & Bierschbach, supra 
note 6, at 138 (discussing victim satisfaction with restorative justice). 
 298. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 142 n.286. 
 299. Id. at 92 (describing how remorse is a strong factor determining the sentencing practices 
of judges); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n.5 (2011) (officially 
recognizing acceptance of responsibility as a mitigating factor. In pertinent part, the commentary 
to section 3E1.1 reads: “The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s 
acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled 
to great deference on review.”). For more discussion, see Paul H. Robinson et al., Extralegal 
Punishment Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, Good Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and 
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Yet, scholars have challenged the soundness of judicial use of 
“remorse and apology as a valid measure of amenability to treatment 
or a fair metric for punishment.”300 Indeed, this moment when a 
youthful offender may understand and express remorse provides a 
wonderful learning opportunity, but not one on which the offender’s 
fate should depend. There are two obstacles to understanding an 
offender’s true feelings of remorse and his or her capacity for 
remorse: (1) the offender, especially a young one, may not have the 
intellectual and emotional ability to appropriately convey remorse, 
and (2) if the sincerity and depth of the offender’s remorse must be 
assessed, it has to be assessed by a fallible human being with biases 
and vested interests—judges,301 attorneys,302 victims,303 and 
mediators.304 An individual charged with assessing a defendant may 
not appreciate the disconnect between the offender’s capacity and his 
expression. 
At first blush, the public and lawmakers alike might view an 
alternative to incarceration as far too lenient on offenders and 
unpopular with victims. Through education about the success of such 
programs, not just in terms of reduced recidivism but also in terms of 
increased victim satisfaction, programming could win the support of 
the public and of legislators. Postadjudication restorative justice 
mediations significantly increase opportunities for the offenders’ 
rehabilitation and the likelihood for victim satisfaction.305 
Restorative justice programs appear to reduce recidivism 
rates.306 Specifically, victim-offender mediations, like the ones I 
propose, reduce recidivism.307 Like Marcus, offenders who 
participate in restorative justice programs are forced to confront the 
 
Other Such Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal Punishment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737 
(2012). 
 300. Henning, supra note 9, at 1149. 
 301. Id. at 1140. 
 302. Id. at 1142. 
 303. Id. at 1143. Indeed, Henning explains how difficult it is to keep victims’ statements in 
proper perspective when courts, probation officers, and police officers rely upon them. Id. at 
1142. To alleviate this concern, Henning proposes that victim impact statements should be 
reserved only for the post-disposition phase and excluded from disposition hearings. Id. at 1135. 
 304. Id. at 1167–68. 
 305. Id. at 1135. 
 306. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 117 n.153. 
 307. Id. at 132–33. 
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reality of what they have done. Confronting the harm that offenders 
caused to their victims has the capacity to change them and impact 
their likelihood of re-offending. There is specific data reflecting that 
mediation reduces recidivism not only for juveniles308 but for adult 
offenders as well.309 One meta-analysis “found that 72 percent of 
mediation programs reduced the rate of re-offending.”310  
Victim satisfaction is another benefit to restorative justice 
mediations.311 One study found that 79 percent of victims who 
participated in mediations were satisfied versus 57 percent of victims 
who were satisfied by the traditional court system.312 Specifically, 
victims who have participated in mediation benefit from an increased 
perception of safety in society as a result. A study of victims who 
participated in restorative justice mediations in both the United 
States and Canada found that victims who participated were “50 
percent less likely to express fear of re-victimization than the 
comparable cohort of victims who did not [participate in] 
mediation.”313 To the extent that victims of crime desire monetary 
restitution, they may also be happier with restorative justice 
processes conducted in the community.314 
Critics of restorative justice who perceive leniency may not be 
persuaded by arguments of effectiveness. Offenders, however, must 
bear emotional difficulties through the process of confronting the 
pain and suffering they caused. Hearing about the impact of their 
transgressions and expressing remorse constitutes a type of painful 
suffering.315 Confronting these difficult emotions is stressful, 
particularly for young people unfamiliar with productive ways of 
 
 308. Id. at 132. 
 309. Id. at 132–33 nn.231–32. 
 310. LEVIN, supra note 94, at 2. 
 311. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 117; Henning, supra note 9, at 1164–65. 
 312. LEVIN, supra note 94, at 2; see also Joshua Wachtel, Restorative Justice Backed by Over 
95% of Crime Victims, RESTORATIVE WORKS (June 16, 2012), http://restorativeworks.net/ 
2012/06/restorative-justice-backed-by-over-95-of-crime-victims/. 
 313. LEVIN, supra note 94, at 2. 
 314. Victims, especially those who have suffered a property crime, want to be financially 
compensated for their monetary losses. This is hard to accomplish when offenders are 
incarcerated. See LEVIN, supra note 94, at 1 (showing that among burglary victims surveyed in 
Iowa, 81.4 percent are most interested in financial restitution and least interested (7.1 percent) in 
a prison sentence of a year or more). 
 315. Henning, supra note 9, at 1150. 
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coping with these emotions and experiences. It may surprise readers 
and fans of retributive justice that many of those who spent time both 
as inmates and in probation or parole find community-based 
supervision more challenging: “Inmates who were surveyed ranked 
equivalent time in seven alternative sanctions such as day reporting, 
intensive supervision probation, and community service as tougher 
than prison.”316 
B.  Defense Concerns 
 
A defendant who engages in a pretrial diversion program or a 
meeting such as the one in which Marcus and his victims participated 
risks incriminating him or herself. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, and the state constitution corollaries, guarantee 
criminal defendants the right against self-incrimination.317 Much of 
the concern about self-incrimination dissipates if the mediation takes 
place after sentencing. However, if a defendant entered into 
mediation and throughout the course of mediation revealed 
information about other crimes that were not charged, additional 
charges could be levied against him or her based on those 
admissions. At that point, he or she would be disincentivized from 
participating. Indeed, without binding assurances that those 
communications are confidential and could not be used in any 
fashion, either directly or derivatively, to gather evidence and launch 
criminal charges, a defendant would be foolhardy to participate or 
would be chilled from participating in a meaningful and open way. 
Timing the mediation as a part of a community sentence of 
probation assures that a defendant will not incriminate him or herself 
in the instant case. To promote openness, there must be binding legal 
safeguards ensuring that nothing that the offender shared would be 
used either directly or indirectly to prosecute him or her for any 
crimes. Specifically, an offender should be entitled to a guarantee 
that anything he or she reveals about this crime—the crime for which 
the mediation is occurring—will not be used to revoke his or her 
probation or file sentencing enhancements. Further, nothing an 
 
 316. LEVIN, supra note 94, at 2. 
 317. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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offender discloses about unrelated crimes could be used against him 
or her. The agreement would be between the defendant and law 
enforcement and prosecuting agencies, both federal and state. The 
defendant would be entitled to the advice of his or her criminal 
attorney about the restorative justice process and the agreement prior 
to entering into the agreement. An offender should have the 
opportunity to talk with his defense attorney about any concerns 
prior to agreeing to such a program as a part of his or her sentence 
because not affording a defendant such an opportunity could also run 
afoul of coercion concerns. Sanctions should be imposed for any 
violation of the agreement. 
Juvenile courts afford children with confidentiality.318 This 
confidentiality exists to ensure that children have an opportunity to 
reform without forever having the shadow of their past cast over 
their heads. Confidentiality also reduces the impact of shaming and 
stigmatizing children, therefore intruding on the goal of 
rehabilitation.319 In juvenile court, where confidentiality is a 
mandate, those concerns would be further complicated. 
Timing is key. Incorporating these programs into a community-
based program of probation after sentencing addresses the concern 
about confidentiality in the courtroom. Further, it allows victims the 
ability to participate in the process without requiring their 
participation in the court’s sentencing hearing, a hearing that should 
be confidential to protect the child. 
 
 
 
 
 318. See Henning, supra note 9, at 1158 (“Confidentiality was linked to the rehabilitative 
philosophy of the juvenile justice system since it was understood that confidential proceedings 
would allow youth to benefit from treatment and services while being protected from the stigma 
of a criminal record that might impede their progress in school, work, and the community.”). 
 319. See id. at 1124 (recognizing the existence of “procedural barriers, such as confidentiality 
protections for accused youth” in juvenile court); id. at 1126 (stating that child advocates, in 
response to proposed victims’ rights legislation, feared that “eroding confidentiality . . . would 
stigmatize the child”). 
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C.  Implementation Issues 
 
Whenever there is a new program, cost is factor. However, 
community sentences of probation with restorative justice 
programming will be less expensive than sentences of 
incarceration.320 Taxpayers will ultimately benefit from less money 
expended on incarceration.321 
The number of hours spent in mediation may depend on the 
crime, the offender, and the victim. In Texas, the “Lubbock County 
Dispute Resolution Center estimates mediation costs as little as $75 
per case.”322 At that center, there are about 600 criminal mediations 
per year.323 Their funding comes from untapped victims’ group 
sources.324 For instance, in Texas, the governor’s office gives over 
$28 million a year in federal money for victims programs.325 
In Marcus’s case and in Ben’s case, both offenders faced 
mandatory minimum sentences of incarceration based on the 
charges. Additionally, after a plea agreement was reached in 
Marcus’s case, he faced two more obstacles to a community-based 
sentence. His offense carried a soft-minimum of two years of 
incarceration and a guideline sentence of a minimum of two years 
incarceration. Under recent case law and within the current system, 
 
 320. The mediation programs that I propose would be in addition to the probation expenses 
for offenders serving community-based sentences. Despite this, probation is far less expensive to 
administer than incarceration. Greenwood, supra note 278, at 186 (stating that “recent analyses 
have shown that investments in appropriate delinquency-prevention programs can save taxpayers 
seven to ten dollars for every dollar invested, primarily in the form of reduced spending on 
prisons”). In Texas, for example, probation “costs less than $2 per day compared to $56.10 per 
day for prison.” LEVIN, supra note 94, at 3. In 2010, the average cost per day for youth 
committed to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) ranged from $23.13 for community-based 
supervision to $359.58 for TYC institutions. Tri-Cnty. Coal. for Literacy & Cmty. Servs., Cost to 
Incarcerate a Youth in Texas,  http://tricountycoalition.org/Cost%20to%20Incarcerate%20a 
%20Youth%20in%20Texas.htm (last visited July 31, 2013). 
 321. In addition to putting cash savings from incarceration toward the implementation of 
restorative justice programming in the community, funds could also be diverted to public 
education, substance abuse treatment, the neglect and abuse system, and mental health services, 
which are all areas that would help better serve the vulnerable population most at risk for 
committing offenses. 
 322. LEVIN, supra note 94, at 2. 
 323. Id. 
 324. See Henning, supra note 9, at 1166. 
 325. LEVIN, supra note 94, at 2. 
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sentencing guidelines are voluntary, which theoretically would allow 
for nonadherence to sentencing guidelines.326 However, statutory 
constraints like mandatory minimums would still pose obstacles to 
implementing my Proposal with youthful offenders who committed 
and were convicted of offenses deemed serious and violent.327 
In cases where there are only sentencing guidelines and soft 
minimums, judges could easily impose a suspended sentence like the 
one imposed by Marcus’s judge. By so doing, a judge would retain 
the ability to incarcerate an offender should he or she fail to succeed 
in the community. Suspended sentences would provide a sentencing 
judge with leverage if the defendant does not participate in the court-
ordered process or re-offends. Upon proof that an offender has not 
satisfied the probation conditions, a judge may revoke his or her 
probation and impose prison time. Also, if an offender re-offends, he 
or she will face new charges. Mandatory minimums could be 
avoided with deft plea bargaining, but that may prove impossible 
without legislative reform to address harsh mandatory minimum 
sentencing schemes.328 
In implementing a program, court systems should not require 
that defendants and victims participate. Participation would have to 
be voluntary. Legally, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution ensures criminal defendants a right to due process, and 
state constitutions have adopted similar provisions.329 Defendants in 
the criminal system cannot be forced, coerced, or otherwise made to 
participate in a program involuntarily or against their free will.330 
 
 326. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are an advisory scheme. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
the Court addressed the intersection of mandatory sentence statutes and the federal sentencing 
guidelines. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Apprendi Court stated that any 
sentence imposed above the statutory maximum requires a jury finding of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id. at 475–76. 
 327. We need to reform or set aside mandatory minimums—they have gotten out of control. 
See ALEXANDER, supra note 84, at 221. 
   328.   See Holder, supra note 42 (emphasizing the need to rethink mandatory minimum 
sentences and explaining that they are often “counterproductive”). Even Florida, the home of 
Governor Jeb Bush, famous for his “right on crime” mantra, has been considering scaling back on 
harsh mandatory minimum sentences. See Steven Bousquet, Winds Shifting on Crime, TAMPA 
BAY TIMES, Apr. 7, 2011, at 1B. 
 329. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 330. Additionally, the system has an interest in encouraging meaningful participation by 
defendants. However, courts should not attempt to measure just how meaningful an individual 
offender’s participation has been. 
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When the victim wants to participate but the defendant does not, 
the defendant’s participation cannot be mandated. A criminal 
defendant who has been convicted has to voluntarily choose 
probation and can always refuse a sentence of probation in favor of a 
prison sentence. Yet, a defendant will certainly be incentivized to 
participate when offered a community sentence with a suspended 
prison sentence hanging over his or her head.331 Should the 
defendant refuse to participate, there will still be other opportunities 
for the victim to participate. For instance, a victim could participate 
in mediation with a different offender whose victim did not want to 
participate. 
When an offender wants to participate, but his or her actual 
victim does not want to participate, the victim would be free to 
decline the opportunity to participate.332 But the offender should not 
be precluded from participation in a rehabilitatively beneficial 
restorative justice program simply because his actual victim did not 
want to participate in a mediation. There are other options that would 
ensure that the offender still has an opportunity to participate. The 
role of the victim could be played by other crime victims of similar 
offenses (perhaps those victims whose offenders did not want to 
participate or whose offender was never located and arrested), by 
actors, or by other community member volunteers. In such situations, 
an offender can still reap the benefits of participation—namely, 
learning to understand and appreciate the consequences of his 
actions.333 
 
 331. A less effective approach would be for an offender to participate while incarcerated. In 
such a situation, an offender could file a motion to reduce the term of incarceration based on his 
or her participation. This approach is not proposed and would be problematic because it still 
exposes the offender to all the negative impacts of incarceration. 
 332. But doesn’t this punish the offender and deny him a shot at rehabilitation? How would 
you reconcile that? The victim should not have this power. 
 333. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6, at 116–17 (“Victims, offenders, and community 
members who have met and engaged in apologetic discourse overwhelmingly feel satisfied and 
relieved. Offenders who were interviewed, for example, reported feeling ‘happy because all my 
feelings were out.’ . . . Offenders welcomed the chance to ‘explain their own behavior, apologize, 
ease their consciences and reduce feelings of guilt.’” (quoting MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS 
OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION 101 (1994); Lutz Netzig & 
Thomas Trenczek, Restorative Justice as Participation: Theory, Law, Experience and Research, 
in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, 241, 256 (Burt Galaway & Joe 
Hudson eds., 1996))). 
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Differences in cultural, ethnic, and racial identity, 
socioeconomic status, and educational background may all lead to 
misperception, miscommunication, conscious and unconscious bias, 
and prejudice. Often, victims and offenders are from very similar 
communities—both are groups that are more likely to be poor and 
racial minorities. Yet, there are instances, like in Marcus’s case, 
where the victims are from different racial, cultural, socioeconomic, 
and educational backgrounds. These cases present challenges in 
communication and understanding, but also offer great learning 
opportunities for both parties. 
The solution to accounting for differences is to squarely address 
those differences with a trained facilitator in both a preparatory phase 
before the mediation as well as in a final debriefing phase. A trained 
mediator is essential to the solution to this problem. The mediator 
would need to be sensitive to the cultural, economic, racial, religious, 
ethnic, and other differences unique to the community in which the 
offender and victim live.334 The success of such programming would 
depend on someone who can be sensitive and facilitate discussions 
even when there are conscious and unconscious racial resentments 
and judgments.335 
The program that this Article has proposed is not a true or pure 
restorative justice program, though it is somewhere along the 
continuum. One tenet of a pure restorative justice process is 
participatory decision making, which would mean that victims and 
offenders all participate in deciding upon the consequences. This 
Proposal does not have a component of participatory decision 
making and is therefore not a pure restorative justice program. 
It is important to be transparent in the labeling and naming of 
any programs. This Proposal is for a developmentally appropriate 
and community-based sentence of probation for youthful offenders. 
In describing a particular program to be implemented as a part of a 
sentence of probation, this Article borrows heavily from restorative 
justice models (so perhaps using the name restorative justice could 
create resentment or confusion). While this Proposal is along the 
restorative justice continuum, its focus is rehabilitation of youthful 
 
 334. In the words of Cornel West, “Race Matters.” CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1993). 
 335. See ALEXANDER, supra note 84, at 226, 227, 230. 
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offenders. The program that this Article proposes is, first and 
foremost, intended to educate offenders by offering guidance as they 
become adults.336 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
By implementing a developmentally appropriate, community-
based sentence with restorative justice type programming, the 
behavior of many youthful offenders could be addressed in the 
community with programs that respond directly to youthful thinking. 
Youthful offenders are entitled to age-appropriate sentences that 
afford them educational opportunities, such as the opportunity to 
understand the consequences of their offending behavior, develop 
empathy, nurture their feeling of connection to their community, and 
promote their overall respect for the law. Through the 
implementation of restorative justice programming, youthful 
offenders will have both the tools and experience enabling them to 
think more about the consequences of their behavior before acting in 
the future. Restorative justice responds directly to youthful thinking 
and behavior with education and can rehabilitate individuals who 
have the capacity to grow and learn. Such programming as a part of a 
community-based sentence is faithful to penological justifications 
and makes good sense when comparing it to incarceration. Providing 
developmentally-based community programming for as many 
amenable youthful offenders as early as possible presents 
opportunities to reduce recidivism, enhance the probability that 
young people will grow into law-abiding citizens, reduce overall 
incarceration rates, and save money.337 
 
 336. While increased victim satisfaction is a benefit, it is not an explicit goal. 
 337. See Guggenheim, supra note 200, at 487–88. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 84, 
at 209–48 (emphasizing the importance of changing the general public’s collective denial to fix 
the problem of mass incarceration, which disproportionately impacts minorities). There has also 
been a recent trend in this country to reform expensive policies that have led to over-
incarceration. For example, in its 2012 election referendum, California voted to limit offenses that 
can be considered a third strike. Jack Leonard, Prop. 36 Seeks to Ease California’s Three-Strikes 
Law, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/ 27/local/la-me-prop36-
3strikes-20121028 (“The proposition’s changes would not apply to offenders with previous 
convictions for murder, rape or child molestation, or to those whose latest offense involved a sex 
crime, major drug dealing or use of a firearm.”); see also Reuters, Jeb Bush Signs Right On Crime 
Statement of Principles (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.reuters.com/article 
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Nonetheless, more information is needed to guide the specific 
implementation of such a proposal. Educating, instead of 
incarcerating, is the right thing to do. With only 0.2 percent of the 
DOJ’s budget devoted to research, there are significant gaps in 
research and data.338 For instance, it would be helpful to know 
whether the effectiveness of such programming depends on the stage 
at which it is implemented (probation), the age of the offender, the 
type of offense committed, or the jurisdiction of the sentencing court 
(juvenile or adult). And, Does it matter if the offense was committed 
as a juvenile or an adult? Does the approach work more successfully 
for first time offenders or those that have previously served time; in 
 
/2011/09/02/idUS143110+02-Sep-2011+PRN20110902 (announcing that as the newest signatory 
of the Right On Crime Statement of Principles, Florida Governor Jeb Bush joins “dozens of 
conservative leaders supporting conservative criminal justice reforms”); Maroney, supra note 13, 
at 175 (explaining that since “recent fiscal challenges have wrought change, as states seek to 
avoid costly incapacitation if cheaper alternatives, like supervised release and family therapy, can 
be shown equally effective”); Editorial, Money Saved, Safer Streets, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 25, 2009, at 
14, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-04-25/news/0904240242_1_juvenile-
detention-center-illinois-kids (noting that the “Redeploy Illinois” program “saves money and 
steers kids in the right direction” by keeping them out of more costly detention while 
simultaneously reducing recidivism); Jackie Nash, Legislation Would Transform Ohio’s Criminal 
Prosecution of Delinquent Children, DAILY REP., July 7, 2009, at 1 (discussing H.B. 235, which 
would prioritize cheaper community-based treatment over incarceration). Fiscal challenges also 
have created opposing pressures, highlighting the need to focus policymakers on principles even 
in hard economic times. See Kate Howard, Budget Cuts Could Hurt Nashville’s Juvenile Court, 
TENNESSEAN, Mar. 23, 2009, at B1 (reporting that victims’ rights group and a judge both warn of 
negative fallout from cuts to programming and probation services). 
 338. For instance, only 0.2 percent of the DOJ budget ($54 million out of $27 billion) goes to 
research as compared to 7 percent of the Department of Health and Human Services budget 
($28.5 billion out of $707.7 billion) and 7 percent of the EPA budget ($504 million out of $7.2 
billion). ROSENBERG & MARK, supra note 40, at 12. More research is needed based on the 
specific groups of offenders, ages of offenders, offense types, timing of the restorative process, 
specific types of processes used, and particular communities and victims impacted. Some of the 
data offered in this paper is in the form of “soft” anecdotal evidence from the stories of Ben and 
Marcus.  
Hard evidence consists of quantitative data—oftentimes primary data gathered by 
researchers from experiments (preferably randomized control trials), as well as 
secondary social and epidemiological data collected by government agencies or 
through survey questionnaires. Soft evidence, on the other hand, is qualitative data 
such as testimonials or anecdotes. Cost-benefit analysis requires hard, quantitative 
evidence, and rigorous cost-benefit analysis will insist on quantitative evidence that has 
been collected using scientifically tested methodologies.  
Id. at 10; see also Holder, supra note 42 (emphasizing the need for smart and cost-effective 
policy responses to crime and social problems: “Particularly in these challenging times—when 
budgets are tight, federal sequestration has imposed untenable and irresponsible cuts, and leaders 
across government are being asked to do more with less . . . .”). 
REDUCING INCARCERATION 9/6/2014  11:46 AM 
884 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:801 
 
other words, does jail exposure reduce the effectiveness of such an 
approach? As a general matter, offenders who have served time in 
jail or prison may face poor recidivism rates. Therefore, it seems that 
catching offenders before they ever enter an incarceration facility is 
the best tactic.339 
No matter what processes we engage in, we need to be mindful 
of race, ethnicity, class, socioeconomics, cultural forces, and 
differences in urban and rural areas. Only by keeping these factors in 
mind will we be able to assess how those differences can be 
approached in order to constructively create meaningful learning 
opportunities for youthful offenders. 
 
 
 339. The Washington State Institute for Public Policy determined that incarceration is a 
financially expensive and minimally effective method of lowering crime rates, providing only two 
dollars of benefits for every dollar spent. BALCK, supra note 60, at 13. 
